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This paper analyses and discusses, from a political economy perspective, the long period of the 
Spanish economy, starting at the end of the Civil War and ending in 1993, being our final goal to es-
tablish whether what happened in that period of time in Spain can be characterized as a “success.” 
The analysis is initiated in 1936 when a military uprising led by General Franco, successfully won 
a civil war and becoming in a military dictatorship regime, which extended itself until 1975. After 
the dead of General Franco in 1975, though with much pain, a transition to a democratic regimen 
was initiated, being a first millstone the new Constitution of 1978. Since then the new regime was associated to an economic development with no precedents, despite economic and political crisis 
periods. We end in 1993, when a cycle or sub-period is over, a new economic crisis starts and Spain culminates its entrance at the European Union and, particularly, at the Monetary and Economic 
Union what, as it is well known, means the assumption of the Euro as a currency with a substantial change on the political and social policies role. 
The paper has three sections. In the first one we review the political economy of the Francos’s 
regime and the transformations of the productive model, following the conflicts and struggles for 
political power amongst the different groups of the ruling class. This first section concludes with 
the main economic features following the recovery of the democracy, finishing in 1993 when Spain 
joins the Economic and Monetary Union. In this first section we pay a special attention to the evo-
lution of the GDP per capita and its sectorial breakdown, the unemployment, the rate of inflation 
and the inequality. In the second section, the role of the State is analysed, according to a distinction 
between regulation and intervention practices. The analysis of the intervention practices distin-guishes the direct one, that is, the role of the state-owned enterprises, from the indirect one, that 
is, the role of the public administration budget, paying attention to public expenditures, taxes, 
fiscal balance and public debt magnitudes and composition. The third section is devoted to the study of the role of industrial sector and its interrelationship with the internationalization and 
the technological changes as an engine of “development” during this long period. The paper finish with some concluding remarks.
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51. Spain´s Political Economy, 1939-
1992. From Fascist isolationism 
up to the integration into Europe-
an Union.
We have to start remarking that the object of 
the present paper is just to analyse the eco-nomic role of the Spanish State as well as its impact on the productive system, particularly considering the industrial sector, and the tech-nical change as an engine of “development”. Our study focus on the period starting at the end of the Civil War, which was initiated when 
a military uprising led by General Franco, suc-
cessfully ended and becoming in a regime which extended itself until 1975. Following to it, the role of the State is also analysed from the point of view of the process to democracy as well as its consolidation since 1978, a new re-gime associated to an economic development with no precedents despite economic and po-litical crisis periods. We end in 1993, when a 
cycle or sub-period is over, a new economic crisis starts and Spain culminates its entrance at the European Union and, particularly, at the Monetary and Economic Union what, as it is well known, means the assumption of the Euro 
as a currency with a substantial change on the political and social policies role. In addition, as is well known, in the 1990s, a profound change 
began in the way the world economy operatesWe are going to make a difference among the 
following periods: A first one, since the end of 
the Civil War until beginning 50´s of the past 
century. A second period goes between 1951 and 1959. A third period goes since 1960 until 1975 which is coincident with the 1973 world-
wide economic crisis climax and the Franco´s death. A fourth period starting in 1976 with the decadence of the regime in force, the tran-sition to the democracy and its consolidation, 
therefore to be separated in two sub-periods: Since 1976 until middle of 1984, and since then until 1993, the time when a new econom-
ic crisis starts and after which Spain joins the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
For a better understanding of the role of the State on economy, what we call economic pol-
icy, the main basic object of this essay, we see 
as a previous and necessary step to ask which kind of regime was imposed after the success-ful military upraise starting in 1936 and van-
quishing after the Civil War. This is because our outlook of analysis is what is known as “Politi-cal Economy”, it is to say, the part of the Social Sciences studying the social relationships of 
production, distribution and consumption of those goods (and services) which allow the material satisfaction of any population as well as its reproduction, paying attention to social rules and institutions on which such a rela-tionship is developed. There is a long term discussion among histori-
ans and political scientists about how to define the political model – and the economic model- imposed after the Civil War. It goes ahead from 
a pure terminological debate, due in a part to 
the confusion made since the beginning, based 
on the upraised assertions made by the rebels 
themselves about their definition and charac-teristics1. It is, no doubt, a military dictatorship as a result of a military insurrection which 
self-definition was changing along the time, nevertheless more regarding the forms than 
its being. 
The fact that General Franco took the leader-
ship of State and Government at the same time, 
being called “Caudillo” (Chief), so that it is gen-
erally said that the regime was “franquist” or 
“franquism” gives indeed an idea of the rele-
vant political autonomy degree obtained by the political superstructure. The dictator is going 
to get an undiscussed power, being personally powerful and concentrating on his own head the full power, acting as a referee solving the 
questions among the dominant classes, basi-cally the large agricultural owners and aristoc-
racy, the financial capital (the Banks) and the 
industrial bourgeoisie as well as large groups 
of petty bourgeoisie and public employees. And, as ideological and material content, mili-taries and Catholic Church were the support. 
Since its beginning, franquism is self-defined as a totalitarian State, with a huge presence of 1 The following is basically based on Biescas and Tuñón 
de Lara (1980), Braña, Buesa y Molero (1979) and Riquer (2010). 
6militaries on the Government activity, who are 
going to become in a regime´s faction with and special leadership on repression. The second 
faction are going to be the so called “falangis-tas”, the third one the traditional monarchist, 
the fourth one the financial capital and the fifth one the Catholics, despite within the latter it 
can be distinguished two different groups: At 
the beginning the catholic will be those linked to the Catholic Propagandists National Asso-
ciation and later on these will be removed by those linked to Opus Dei. Leaving apart the 
catholic, the rest of factions are going to be framed into the sole Party, the so called Na-tional Movement. Until the end of the Second World War the to-talitarian shape regime takes as its references the fascist regimes of the Nazi´s Germany and 
Mussolini´s Italy and defines itself as national-trade unionist and taking, on the other hand, the ultra-conservative Spanish tradition, of 
middle age character, represented by Falange. 
Notwithstanding and since the beginning the Catholic Church as well as the Vatican are go-
ing to play a legitimating role  by fully involving 
themselves on the Civil War, justifying it and 
giving an ideological coverage to the rebels2 in change of recovering their economic power, 
the influence and the privileges which had got 
earlier than the Second Republic came.  But since 19463, and no leaving its totalitar-
ian shape, the regime is going to defined itself 2 Catholic hierarchy is going to bless and support the military uprising to which will see the as an “armed 
plebiscite”, a “crusade” against the communism and the 
liberalism considered, by the way, as a sin. Also, it helped 
to extend ideas justifying and accepting the wild and 
bloody repression which started since the beginning of 
the insurrection, as well as the public employees purges. 
Character, extension and terrible results of repression 
and purges are described by Tuñón de Lara (Biescas and 
Tuñon de Lara, 1980) and Riquer (Riquer, 2010; chapter 
3). As Riquer remarks ((2010; 121) “Never in Contempo-
rary History, a civil conflict was followed with a so wide, 
violent and prolonged revenge. The franquist Regime made of the repression a need to hold and consolidate the Dictatorship. There was no interest to integrate from 
the political point of view to the losers but it was wanted 
only their destruction or their submission”. 
3 In September 1945 the fascist salutation was elimi-nated.
as a Catholic, Social and Representative State, inventing the concept of “Organic Democracy” 
established as a Kingdom (Bill of Succession dated July 26th 1947). A national-catholic 
system on which the tyranny of the beginning was mitigated once the ideological role (col-
laborationist and repressor) from the Catholic Church was consolidated and remarked after the signature of the Concordat with the Holy 
See in 1953. Along the 50´s a new change oc-
curs: the decisive influence from United States, 
which orbit had not totally left. The fascist ex-pressions disappear nearly at all4 being sub-
stituted by a right-wing authoritarian system, still a dictatorship which holds an strong re-
pressive set and where the financial capital ob-tains an hegemonic position within the domi-
nant block..
Braña, Buesa y Molero (1977; 255) assert that 
during the first few years of franquism, at least 
until beginning of 50´s, we are in front of a 
military dictatorship (something obvious on 
the other hand) and absolutely not in front of a 
fascist regime, however both are situations of exception, following on this way Nicos Poulant-
zas (1973). At the beginning of 50´s a restruc-
turing within the block in power takes place, 
starting on a Government change dated July 18th 1951, reinforcing so the hegemonic role 
of the financial capital. However, until 1957 there is a strong competition among dominant classes and factions. Hence, as Braña, Buesa 
and Molero (1979) assert, since the begin-
ning of 50´s an authoritarian-bureaucratic is 
established, as these authors follow the defini-
tion made by Guillermo O´Donnell (O´Donnell, 1975). In addition, the fact that there are not political parties drives to the development and functioning of a serial of bureaucratic rings, 
as defined by Fernando H. Cardoso (Cardoso, 1974). Such a form of State will survive until 
the representative democracy is re-established in 1978. 
4 Let´s remind the presence of an American military dele-
gation by the beginning of 1948, the credit given by Chase 
National Bank in 1949, the credit approved by the U.S. 
Congress in 1950, the sales of wheat by the U.S. Adminis-
tration or just to finish the Aid Agreement signed in 1953, 
plus others from privates and described by Braña, Buesa 
y Molero (1979; 193).
7What are the ideology and the economic practice, in particular the economic practice 
belonging to these forms of State? Before re-
sponding such a question, it is convenient to 
make a little bit of History. It must be kept on 
mind that after the bourgeois revolution which 
takes place in Spain by the middle of Nine-teenth Century, the Spanish economy inserts itself within the worldwide capitalism as a peripheral and dependent economy, as Braña, Buesa and Molero (1976) deeply documented. The Spanish nationalist capitalism stage dur-
ing the first third of Twentieth Century, is go-
ing to become possible, among other reasons, due to the situation of external vacuum5 caused 
by the First World War and the crisis of hege-
mony in Great Britain, with a new accumula-
tion phase which begins after the end of the Second World War, when the hegemony of the United States is consolidated.
 Starting on the first period of Dictatorship, within the economic model designed dur-
ing the Civil War and tried to be consolidated 
since 1939, we find a continuity of the Spanish 
nationalism which runs from the beginning of Nineteenth Century of which main character-istic expression within the economic sphere is the protectionism. Nevertheless, and regard-ing its functioning will depend at the end on 
export chances, basically Eastern agriculture 
and mining, despite it would appear to be par-
adoxical (Braña, Buesa and Molero, 1977; 132-
133). But though there is a qualitative change 
since 1939, as then it is not only about to pro-tect the national production, a key element on 5 As external vacuum it is understood “a development period of capitalism in a social dependent structure, cor-
responding to a world´s capitalism crisis on which once 
the loops of subjection linking the dominant class on it to the dominant classes in hegemonic centers, productive 
resources are unblocked.  It allows to preserve the most or the whole generated surplus so that a restructuration 
of the Economy with the subsequent promotion of new 
classes or classes portions to the block in Power. Such a 
restructuration drives by its own dynamics to a new or-
ganization of the said social structure within the Wordl´s 
system and when it overcomes the above mentioned cri-
sis a new dependency form is established corresponding 
to a new hegemony at a World´s scale (Braña, Buesa y 
Molero, 1976; 121).  The concept is taken from De la Peña 
(1971; 104 y ss.), despite this author does not define it on an explicit way. 
the so called Spanish nationalist capitalism way since the end of the Nineteenth Century, when the keystone is a customs tariff protec-tion, the foreign trade policy.  It is tried as well 
to arrive up to an economic self-sufficiency6 
by deepening in import substitution policy, an economic growth model which connects to a well-known thinking line and design of eco-nomic policy developed in Latin America since 
middle of 40´s in Twentieth Century. Further-
more, it is essential to remark that, equally as 
happened by the first third of such the same 
Century, by the 40´s there is again an external 
vacuum context.  Just to understand the economic policy dur-
ing these first years, the dictator´s economic thinking acknowledgement might help. First of all, and in his view, the Spanish economy earlier than 1936 malfunctioned due to the po-litical parties and trade unions, so that it was necessary to suppress them. Secondly, “Spain 
is a privileged country which is able to self-reliance. We have everything to live and our 
production is abundant enough to secure our self-surviving. We do not need to import noth-
ing at all”. Gold and currencies were absolutely 
not important; the important thing was to hold 
raw materials (Fontana, 1986; 29).  In order to 
finance the war and re-building expenses he 
came up with the idea of establishing a tax on 
property of 1% of the capital. It would be the 
purest Spanish conservatism, military quarter version. (Fontana, 2001). The economic model is going to show a strong totalitarian content trying to get the economic independency, dis-
trusting the external economic influences, to 
develop an alternative to liberal capitalism. A 
model led during those years by militaries and engineers.  
The practical result is what at its beginning is 
going to be called autarquía (autarchy), that is to say, home market reserve as a result of 
a combination of nationalism, protectionism and State interventionism, continuing and re-inforcing the way of the Spanish nationalist capitalism. The term is included within the 
6 Supposedly by influence of German and Italian fascisms 
(Biescas. In Biescas and Tuñón de Lara, 1980; 23), what 
is denied by Fontana (1986 y 2001).
8Bill of Regulation and Defense of the National 
Industry, dated November 24th 1939, as well as the Bill of that creates the National Industry 
Institute, dated September 25th, expressing more a desire with a clearly ideological con-tent than a reality7. The meaning of autarquía 
was defined by Perpiñá (1952: 345), referring so the protectionist policies applied since the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century: “Protec-tion to food products and row materials so 
that as much as possible of them are produced 
in Spain; protection to those goods for their 
maximum level of consumption within Spain; protection to the industries so that they have not internal competence and their whole con-sumption were Spanish made. And such a sys-
tem, as it can be seen, has been defined by a 
constant influence from particular lobbies in the political spheres”. Then, it makes no sense to discuss whether there was or not an au-tarkic policy and whether this was imposed 
or wanted by the internal circumstances and 
mainly by external ones. 
In this first period all the three main features, 
in our view, of the State´s economic perfor-
mance are going to be consolidated. First of all, 
the Indirect intervention via a minimum bud-
getary activity, with a first stage of relevant military expenses, within magnitudes of an underdeveloped country, what is connected to 
a very low tax burden and a regressive tax sys-
tem, gnawed by the fraud. On the other hand, a direct very important intervention via State-owned companies, with the goal to arrive up to the industrialization.  And as third feature, an also very important regulation activity to all the scope of economy. We will refer to it later on.
Such an economic model will get a first correc-tion when the Second World was over with a 
7 It is significant that the original name to be given to National Institute of Industry (INI) was, in appearance, 
National Institute of Autarchy, since it would have been 
designed not much to substitute or support the private 
enterprise but to develop the military industry as San Ro-man (2000) defends. The change of such a name explains from our view that the intention was to overcome a mili-tary strategy and the Word “autarchy” was not relevant 
at all. About how the INI role was conceived, see Braña and Buesa (1981).
change of Government in 1945, when the falan-gist strategy is left and it passes to the Nation-al-Catholicism. And it is consolidated when the 
external vacuum situation is broken and the 
first liberalizing measures are taken, returning so to the dependent capitalism which will start 
to reveal since 50´s. 
In 1951 a new change in Government occurs 
and it is going to prepare the join of Spain to 
the Western bloc. The new cabinet introduces 
a few liberalizing measures and a small com-
mercial opening, cancelling the food´s ration cards and the row materials and energetic 
products quota.  It is flashy that an internal 
report from the National Movement quoted by 
Riquer (2010; 395-396) and dated March 14th 1951, considers that Spain was at this time 
under a total economic broken up and a dis-ordered political situation and that Spain had not as it was thought “iron-made groundworks 
but clay-made feet”, an expression which was 
used again to describe the Spanish Economy 
as a result of Spain´s joining the Economic and 
Monetary Union during the second half of 90´s. 
Until 1957 the political conflicts among the 
diverse dominant class factions is not to be 
solved, but the hegemony of the financial 
capital (born from the merge of Banks and in-
dustrial capital) is clear. Its power had been 
consolidated since the beginning of Dictator-ship (Carreras and Tafunell, 2010: 279) and it was saved from the former decade interven-tion policy, avoiding the nationalization as it 
was called by the falangists. But the economic 
policy will be still erratic in the new presence 
of liberalizing ideas, besides the stay of isolat-ing and autarchic ideas. These are times when 
the import substitution process is deepened 
nevertheless subject to the limits imposed by 
a growing commercial deficit, given the weak-ness of exports and the large increase of im-ports. An all this despite the foreign invest-ments start to come and also the imports of 
technology is going to be especially important. Within the political sphere, the Catholics sup-
port belonging to Propagandists National As-
sociation revealed on the Government change does not work. The year 1956 is critical to the 
9Dictatorship since, as unsurpassably Riquer 
summarizes (2010; 383-384): “There are five 
revealed elements on it notably conditioning the time to come of Regime: The unexpected 
and undesired independency of Morocco; The 
University students crisis of February events 
happened in Madrid; the explosion of a new 
wave of workers conflicts; the start of an up-
tight discussion about the need of institution-
alizing definitely the Regime; and the clear 
perception of the fact that the bankruptcy of the State made a change of the economic policy 
to be undeferable”. As a consequence, in 1957 
the ascent of the Opus Dei´s sector to the Gov-
ernment and public institutions is consum-mated, providing the ideology and economic practice (the “technocracy”) needed for the Spanish economy re-integration in a new eco-nomic order of worldwide capitalism. The end 
of 50´s with a change of Government in 1957 are those times of transition, until culmination of leaving the nationalist way with the New 
Economic Management Plan, known as Stabi-lization Plan dated in 1959.   
During the 60´s political tensions are going to 
continue, but extended due to the social con-
flicts, at the factories and universities, affecting to a great part of the society, something that 
repression could not control. Regime´s reac-tion is always and as a last solution the repres-
sion. It is highlighted by the state of emergency (also known as state of exception) in 1962 and 
1963 in the provinces of Asturias, Guipuzcoa and Biscay, (all of these with a strong industri-al presence), in 1967 in Biscay again, in 1968 
in Guipuzcoa and finally in all across Spain 
in 1969. In 1963 Julian Grimau, a communist leader, was executed due to facts supposedly happened during the Civil War as well as two anarchists were executed too for false charges. 
This is the time when a special jurisdictional 
Court is established: The Public Order Court, specialized on political crimes and which will 
make an intense job until 1997, when its name changed to National Court, dealing since then mainly with crimes related to terrorism.At the same time, contradictions among sup-porters to hold the intervention policy and 
those others in favour of full liberalizing of Spanish economy continue. An example of these contradictions is the indicative Planning policy, inspired on the French model and de-
signed by the technocrats, shaped on the three Developing Plans (1964-1967, 1968-1971 and 1972-1975)8. Also the application to become 
a member of the European Economic Com-
munity, in February 1962. Or the resurgence of the protectionist policy in 1965-67, trying to protect those economic sectors which were most awarded with the accumulation during 
the times of external vacuum. Anyhow, be-
hind these policies is the target to stabilize the economy in order to secure the Dictatorship political continuity. But we have not to confuse 
this division about the economic policy with the division within the political sphere, which 
was splitted between those so called “immova-
bilist” and those called “reformists”, as tech-
nocrats are going to support to the first ones 
(Riquer, 2010; 487), being this later faction the 
one with majority at these times Governments. 
In 1969 the so called “Matesa´s Case” blows up. 
Matesa was a company with financial irregu-
larities being support for it with several tech-nocrats Ministers. Nevertheless, the result will 
be not that reformist power increases but, as 
their Ministers were ceased then, just the con-trary, it made the technocrats reinforcement. It 
is proved by the appointment of a new “one-
color” Government in October 1969, ending 
so the shy reformist opening time boosted by them.  
Between 1957-59 and 1976, once a first phase of rationalization of the production system has 
been done at the beginning of 50´s9, an intense 
8 In Estapé and Amado (1986) there is a summary of the characteristics of Spanish indicative planning, which at 
their beginning was presented as a technic to solve all the 
problems that suffered the Spanish economy. In any case, 
it should be remembered that the development plans 
they benefited mainly the large industrial and financial 
groups, as highlighted in Braña, Buesa and Molero (1984; C. III) research.9 The first works of Braña, Buesa and Molero argue that 
in the 1940s a new industrializing stage begins, based on 
the statistics available at that time. Years later a recon-struction of the series of industrial production (Carreras, 
1984) is carried out, that gives the author to affirm that in 
the 1940s there is a “brutal” fall of the process of indus-
10
economic change is going to occur but no with-
out ups and downs. There is a first sub-period of growth until 1967 and a second one with the running down of the model until 1976. 
This change, as described with details by Bra-ña, Buesa and Molero (1980), does mean the full insertion of the Spanish economy into the worldwide capitalism, consolidating a model of industrialization, of economic growth, de-pendent, getting the advantages of three ele-ments coming from the capitalism of central economies, in particular from European ones. 
The first one is related to the high degree of growth averages in the countries of the centre and the new needs of work force to cover those 
non-qualified or low-qualified jobs, which will 
be provided by the immigration coming from peripheral countries. The second one is the 
mass tourism increase, as a consequence of the growth of levels of rent and welfare among the central countries. And the third one, the in-
creasing availability of capital, with special re-gard in this particular case to the United States economy, for what concerns to the foreign cap-ital investments and the technology exports to peripheral countries. 
As a consequence, in 60´s a few important transformations on the productive model take place, nevertheless the restrictions stemming 
from a high inflation, a trade balance defi-cit and the short increase of the employment 
rate (between 1960 and 1973 such a rate was trialization. For which he has to manipulate a little the figures, making international comparisons with the pe-riod 1935-1950, in which the cumulative average growth rate of the industry in Spain is 0.58%, due to the fall that 
occurs because of the civil war. But with its own data it 
is verified that between 1941 and 1951 the index of in-dustrial production grows 3.59%, which until then had 
only been surpassed in the period 1842-1851. Although it is true that in the period 1951-1961 the growth rate 
becomes 8.02% and in the period 1961-1971 is 9.14%. In fact, Miranda (2003) argues that in these years a struc-
tural transformation took place that allowed Spain to be 
placed, at the end of the decade, between the industri-alized economies. A little exaggerated to refer to those years as “the night of Spanish industrialization”, as if for 
the most emphatic condemnation of Franco’s dictator-ship economic arguments of this kind are needed. These 
issues are dealt with in more detail below in analysing the role of the industrial sector and technological innova-tion.
under an accumulated 1% annual), because a very intensive use of the capital, to what we will refer later on. Among these transforma-tions the following are the most relevant: The 
exodus of Spaniards going abroad to work to developed countries in Europe (around 1,5 million) and the important domestic migra-
tion (between 1955 and 1975 around 4,6 million people changed their residence). The 
crisis on traditional agriculture caused by the 
rural exodus, beside a change on production 
to be adapted to the new food requirements, an important development of the cattle rais-ing and the mechanization of farms. And also, the development of the industrial sector10 and services as well as the increase of regional diversities.  Furthermore, in these years the concentration of the economic power in large companies is culminated, especially in the Banks11. It is necessary to remind as well that at the end of the decade Spain loses two of its 
three colonial territories: Equatorial Guinea in 1968 on a traumatic process, and Ifni in 1969, remaining Western Sahara, which is lost in 
1975 with economic consequences still to be evaluated.Finally, during this decade relevant social transformations are going to take place. Among those we would like to highlight, the cities growth at expense of a loss of rural world12: 
the increase of the workers and middle class; the reduction of the illiteracy and the soft in-crease of the education levels with an impor-tant increase of schooling on Primary and High 
School education, beside with an enlargement of the teacher´s body. The founding of Social Se-curity in 1963, which started to provide health coverage up to the 80% of the population in 
1973, as well as the beginning of a public pen-sions system. It is agreed that the main feature 
10 To the point that some historian speaks of Spain finally culminating the industrial revolution, which had “failed” 
until then. This is discussed in depth below.
11 As early as 1942, Franco declared, “Our Crusade has 
been the only war in which the rich have become richer” 
(Tuñón de Lara, quoting Paul Preston, in Biescas and Tu-
ñón de Lara, 1980; 189).
12 Although with a wild urbanism, without the slightest consideration of its tremendous effects on the environ-
ment and accompanied by huge speculation and corrup-tion, especially at the local level.
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of the Social Security “the deep inefficiency at 
the management of resources, basically due to 
the complex bureaucratic system, the absence 
of external control and its subjection to State-
owned companies” (Fusi y Palafox, 1997; 349). Anyhow, the improvement of the level of life 
with the beginning of the consumer society, 
to become as usual at the homes the refrigera-tors, washing machines, televisions and even 
the cars. Such a combination of repression 
which injected a fear in the Spanish society, be-
side these changes and improvements maybe could explain the important social support to 
Dictatorship, with consequences brought even until current time The end of Dictatorship, the transition to rep-resentative Democracy and its consolidation, overcoming social and military sectors threats 
which defend the Franquism is going to have 
as a consequence the attainment of highest 
degree and the subsequent exhaustion of the growth process and of the industrialization. A dependent economic model which could not resist the impact of the 1973 crisis with the 
increase of oil pricing in October 1973, after the ruin of the international economic sys-
tem – the Global Plan – born from the Breton 
Woods agreement in 1971, so well described 
by Varoufakis (2011). 
In December 1973 the Admiral Carrero Blanco, to whom Franco had awarded as Prime Minis-
ter in June, is murdered. For the first time the 
Heads of State and Government had been split-ted. Then, a convulsed political period starts, the transition from Dictatorship to Democracy, 
what will have economic consequences, as 
unavoidably should happen. The Government 
following to the Carrero´s one will be presided 
by a falangist from the “immovabilistic” sec-
tor. It is a Government which includes all the 
Franquism´s families…with the exception of 
the Opus Dei´s technocrats, and that cabinet is going to meet the economic crisis. The reaction from the economic Authorities 
was not to rebound the increase of the ener-gy prices, falling so the account of oil over the 
Public Treasury, with a slack monetary policy 
of low interest rates and abundant financing, 
probably because they were mostly focused 
on home political problems. Among the most important we have: The shocks with sectors of the Catholic Church hierarchy which asked 
for respect to the Basques identity; the tricky 
court trial and subsequent execution of the an-
archist Puig Antich; the success of the “Revolu-tion of Carnations” in Portugal and the collapse 
of the Colonels regime in Greece; the Franco´s 
hospitalization in July 1974; the increase of the 
terrorist actions by ETA and other extremist 
groups like GRAPO or FRAP; the increase of the 
labour and Universities conflicts; the increase of repression with a new state of emergency in 
Guipuzcoa and Biscaye in april 1975; the death 
penalties to two members of ETA and three 
members of FRAP in September 1975; and one month later the invasion of Western Sa-
hara by Morocco, the so called “Green March”, 
which ends with the Spain´s leaving. Anyway, 
it means the domestic disagreement about the 
Regime´s evolution. It ends with the Franco´s 
death in November 20th 1975.The result of not taking measures against the oil prices increase was that energy consump-
tion even grew up, the trade deficit was in-creased, the tourism and foreign investment 
revenues grew down and the foreign indebted-
ness increased as well. Just in February 1973, a devaluation of currency (Peseta at this time) 
was decided, quoting 66 Pesetas to 1 USD. Due to it, the own Spanish economic structure im-
balances sharpened, in particular those re-ferred to the industrial weakness, causing so an important economic slowdown until 1978, 
with an unknown inflation rate arriving up to over 22% in 1977 and arriving in Summer a year-to-year rate of 44%.
With the dictator´s death the Democracy re-covery process starts. In our analysis we are going to distinguish two main periods: 1975-1985 which are the transition times, and 1986-
1993 when the growth is back, mainly driven 
by the entrance in the called then European Economic Community, period which ends with the crisis of 1993, when our work is over.  The process of transition to the Democracy 
came at the beginning beside an explosion of 
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labour conflicts, the resume of terrorist ac-
tions by both ETA and GRAPO, the increase of Police violence with the result of workers dead and the appearance of the violence from the extreme right hand, also with dead people as a 
result. The period is led during the first times 
by Adolfo Suárez and it is going to be stamped 
by the economic crisis impact. Until the first part of the political reform is culminated and 
the first elections take place by June 15th 
1977, it was very difficult to take measures in the economic sphere. Union de Centro Demo-
cratico (UCD) is awarded on elections but this Party, which had met the most of the different reformist political streams from the Dictator-ship, had not a clear political ideology, even incorporating social-democrat wings.    UCD is going to get 34,4% of votes and 165 seats at 
the Congress, as the Spanish system is bicam-
eral, since the Senate was established as the 
second Chamber13.
These first measures are not going to be taken until the end of 1977 with the so called “Cove-nants of Moncloa” which drive to the Economic 
Reform and Stabilizing Program approved in 
13 It seems to be interesting to detail a little bit the re-sults. Among the Parties for election in the whole Spain, 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Socialist 
Party)) obtained 29.3% of votes and 118 seats in Con-
gress; Partido Comunista de España (PCE, Communist Party) 9.3% and 20 seats: Alianza Popular (AP) which 
meets Franco´s Regime reformists with involvement in 
Government who did not want to be integrated in UCD, 
obtains 8.2% and 16 seats; Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), 4.5% and 6 seats. For what concerns to “nacional-ist” Parties, it is to say regional Parties, in Catalonia the 
Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya obtained 2.81% and 11 
seats; a Party which is a coalition of Catalan Christian-
Democracy and the Center gets 0.94% and 2 seats; Es-
querra Republicana de Catalunya, 0.79% and 1 seat; in 
Basque Country, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) ob-
tains 6.3% and 8 seats; Euskadiko Ezkerra 0.34% and 1 seat. Another two regional Center Parties, one in Aragon (0.2%) and the other one in the province of Castellon, 
(.,16%) obtain one seat each (something what gives an 
idea about the problems caused by the election rules, still unsolved today). Nevertheless, the second one of the last 
mentioned will integrate in UCD Parliament Group. In to-
tal, those Parties coming Franco´s Regime (AP and UCD) sum 43.10% of votes, left hand Parties (PSOE, PSP and PCE) sum 43.11%, the “nationalist” Parties 6.50% well understood that there was center- right and left hand 
Parties among them. A 5.7% of voters did not obtain any representation at the Congress. 
September14. The economic measures agreed with the moderate left hand Parties addressed, 
first of all, to fight against the inflation and the 
deficit of the balance of payments and they were seen as “stabilizing measures”. Measures of “positive adjustment” were taken, as well to 
introduce more flexibility in the markets and restructure those productive sectors which are under crisis. In addition to these measures the social covenants are signed by the socialist 
Trade Union UGT and the Employers Associa-tion CEOE, as another Trade Union, CC.OO. does 
not sign and the Government does not partici-
pate too. The first one of these covenants dated 
July 1979 is an agreement about how to set-up 
the new labor relationship frame and it will be 
reflected by the Bill approving the Statute of 
Workers (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) dated March 1980. The second one, signed in Janu-ary 1980, already contains a policy for rents15. The results are very good and last until 1981 in 
two areas: The inflation grows down nearly 12 
points in percentage and the balance of pay-
ments shows positive figures. And it is despite that crisis strongly strikes again, due to the oil 
prices increase because the war of Iraq and Iran. In 1981 a third covenant is signed, the National Employment Agreement, this time 
signed by the Government, the Employers As-sociation and the most representative Trade 
Unions including for first time CC.OO. This cov-
enant embraces different matters like salaries, employment promotion policies, unemploy-ment coverage and Social Security.Notwithstanding the results are not so good on other spheres. First of all, for productive struc-
ture, because the strong growth of interest rates started in 1977 hardly shocked against 
14 In the drafting of the technical part of these Covenants 
a part of the officials who were in the Stabilization Plan 
will be involved, applying similar measures, based on the recipes of the orthodox economy, the mainstream. 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons for its limited effi-cacy, leaving aside the structural weakness of the Span-ish economy, its dependent and peripheral character, a 
characterization that did not fit into the schemes of those economists, who called those who defended other alter-
natives as “occasional arbitrators”. See the narrative of one of the protagonists (Fuentes, 2005).
15 Among the various published works, we refer to the José Ignacio Pérez Infante (2009).
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the companies which had indebted, among 
other reasons to be able to compensate the la-
bour cost grows, in certain part due to the sala-
ries increases, but on the other hand and much 
more important, due the social contributions increase. 
Secondly, the unemployment rate did not fin-ish to increase since 1977 passing from 5.2% of the working-age population (700.000 peo-ple) up to 15,8% (2.2 million) in 1982 when PSOE wins the elections (Figure 1).  Notwith-standing there are three explanation factors 
jointing on the unemployment (Carreras and 
Tafunell, 2010; 388)16: a) The entrance to the 
labour market of the “baby boom” generations; 
b) Emigration change of way with the return 
of emigrants; And c) The agriculture employ-
ments growth down which, by itself only, might 
explain the Spain´s unemployment differential with the rest of Europe. 
16 A much more complete and convincing explanation 
than usual, which attributes unemployment exclusively 
to the alleged rigidity of the labour market, particularly the high costs of dismissal. See, as an example of the lat-ter argument that keeps repeating like a mantra still to-
day, Rojo (2010).
Figure 1
Source: Statistic National Institute and own elanbora-tion. 
And thirdly, the Banking crisis caused by a 
set of factors (Carreras and Tafunell, 2010; 391-392): a) The links from the Banks to the industrial sector already developed since the 
beginning of the Dictatorship made that the industrial crisis drove to a hard shock on their 
income statements. b) The finance liberalizing 
effects which drove to a war for catching liabil-
ities, with the subsequent growth of operating 
cost. And c) The financial Authorities inability to execute their supervision and surveillance functions. The result of the Banking crisis, of 
which it is not usual to talk about, meant that 58 among the existing 110 Banks disappeared 
between 1977 and 1985, extending so the oli-gopolistic structure on the sector with costs 
close to 2 trillion Pesetas (nearly the double of the cost of industrial reconversion to which we will make a reference later on) of which three 
quarters were provided by the public sector. 
A basic question within this period and with 
deep consequences in the economic sphere is 
the State´s political decentralization, with the 
establishment of the so called State of Autono-
mies. The strong request during the Dictator-ship to hold the language and culture in Cata-
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lonia and Basque Country, which were hardly repressed, as well as the demand to recover 
the political autonomy obtained during the 
Second Republic time, were positively replied 
since 1977 by the Government led by Adolfo 
Suarez. In September 29th 1977 by mean of a 
decree the Generalitat of Catalonia is restored 
and in December 30th and also by a decree the 
General Basque Council is established. In 1978 the pre-autonomous entities of Andalusia, Ara-gon, Asturias, Canary Islands, Castille-La Man-
cha, Castille-Leon, Estremadura, Galicia, Bale-aric Islands, Murcia and Valencia17. The State 
of Autonomies is going to be incorporated into the Constitution of 1978, within the Title VIII, 
which will establish two ways to constitute an Autonomous Community with a different assumption of competences: those acceding via article 143 and the ones acceding via ar-ticle 151, the so called “fast way”, with higher 
competences, as since the beginning are going 
to assume the competences on Public Health 
and Education.  Nevertheless, at the final stage all of them could assume (and nearly did) the 
same level of competences. At the beginning 
the Government tried to limit the number of Communities acceding via article 151, produc-
ing so a huge conflict in Andalusia where two 
referendum had to be made to obtain the au-tonomy through such a way. The decentralization process was (and still, 
is since as designed by the Constitution it re-
mained open and undefined) very complex. 
Basque Country and Navarra are going to have a different and particular autonomous system in respect the rest of the Regions, the statutory system what means in fact that the resources 
per habitant will be much higher than the oth-
er and that negotiations will take place on a bi-
lateral basis with the Central Government. For the rest of Regions, called as common system, 
the financing system will be ruled in 1983 by an Organic Bill and an Ordinary law related to 
Taxes Assignment.  In the first one law in not 17 Navarra, which had retained its rights (fueros) dur-
ing the dictatorship, does not become an autonomous community until August 1982, once it was decided not 
to integrate in the Basque Country. So what will be the 
final autonomic map, only remain Cantabria, La Rioja and Madrid, the three one-provincial regions.
explicitly included an equity criterion at the 
time to distribution of resources. And the law gives to the regions a small degree of autono-
my and fiscal co-responsibility. The financing 
system will be furthermore revised every five years. All of that means a permanent process 
of negotiation between the Central Govern-
ment and the Regions, and it must be added 
that the result is a no similar financing level for identical expenditure needs18.After the approval of the Constitution a new call for Elections is made in 1979 and UCD wins again with Adolfo Suarez as Prime Minister, 
while a higher abstention. But the aim of cove-
nant which had characterized the first times of 
transition is broken. PSOE promotes a motion 
of censure at the Parliament against the Gov-
ernment in May 1980, UCD starts to break up 
due to the internal conflicts among its diverse 
groups. The regional elections in Basque Coun-try and Catalonia mean a growth of national-ist parties, and the terrorist offensive increas-
es. The economy is affected by a new energy prices rises, the unemployment continues its 
increase and a new ambient of disappointing 
extends, basically referred to the Government 
but not to the Democracy. And in February 23rd 1981 a military coup which fails happens.   
In October 1982 new Elections are made and 
PSOE wins with 48,1% of votes and absolute 
majority, getting 202 seats at the Congress19. 
18 It is not easy to provide a reference book due to the enormous amount of written and research works, either 
from the economic side or from juridical side. As a gen-
eral one, we risk to recommend the essay by Monasterio (2010). And for what concerns to the decentralization of 
expenses competences process and the problems which 
become in chronic since then, we recommend Braña and Serna (1997).
19 Alianza Popular, with 26.36% of votes and 107 seats 
will be the second political forcé. Centro Democrático y 
Social (CDS) founded by Adolfo Suarez after the UCD´s 
breaking up will be the third one with 6.77% of votes and 11 seats. The catalan nationalist coalition Convergencia I 
Unió will be the fourth with the same seats as CDS but not 
the same votes, just 3.67% (Once again the electoral sys-
tem shortcomings are proved). PCE obtains 4.02% and 4 
seats. Basque Nationalist Party gets 1,88% and 8 seats. 
The remaining seats belong to nationalist Parties: Two of 
them are for the Basque Herri Batasuna (considered as 
ETA´s political arm) with 1% of votes; one is for Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya with 0.66% of votes; and one 
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It is to be remarked that, between the Adolfo Suarez resignation and the call for Elections, 
the Government led by Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, 
an UCD´s technocrat, will make a transcen-
dent decision: The Spain´s join into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the opposition of the whole range of the left hand political Parties.   With the win of PSOE a new and long period that arrives until it loses the Elections in 1996, 
won by the successor Party of Alianza Popular 
which becomes in Partido Popular in 1989. Nevertheless, with the division in periods we 
are following, we closed this first period of De-mocracy in 1985, opening a new one for the 
years 1986-1993, marked by the entrance of Spain into the European Economic Community
The first PSOE´s Government led by Felipe 
Gonzalez finds a deeply damaged economic 
situation, to which he faces with a breach of the program he won the Elections with. The two key Ministers at the economic area come from the Banks: Miguel Boyer (Minister of Economy, 
Public Treasure and Trade) comes from the Bank of Spain and previously from INI. Carlos Solchaga (Minister of Industry and Energy) comes from Banco de Vizcaya (and previously 
from the Bank of Spain too) and their liberal ideology had not too much to do with the origi-
nal approach from affiliates to PSOE. They are going to lead an economic policy characterized 
by a hard adjustment extended until 1985. And it started with a devaluation of currency and an increase of the fuel prices. In summary, the adopted policy will consist of the application of two different kind of mea-sures. In one hand, an orthodox “healthy” mea-sures with a restrictive monetary policy, the 
free float of Peseta, the public deficit reduc-
tion, the end of the Public Treasure resource 
to the Bank of Spain, the poise of the balance of payments (we have to remind on this way that, 
after a few years of surplus, there was a signifi-
cant deficit in 1982) and a slow-down on sala-ries growth. It happened in the last case thanks to the social covenants: The Inter-Confederal 
Agreement dated February 1983 and signed for Euskadiko Ezkerra with 0.48% of votes. 
by all the social agents without the interven-
tion of the Government; and the Economic and Social agreement signed in 1984 and on which CC.OO. did not participate and that is going to 
be in force until 1986.  On the other hand, we have the economic frame “reforms” measures. The industrial re-conversion, an energetic plan, reduction of 
the number State-owned companies, labour 
market reforms, liberalization of services and 
financial market, fiscal reforms, Social Security 
reform (an increase in contribution periods for entitlement to the pension) and reforms of the 
Local and Autonomous Communities financ-ing. The most controversial ones are going to 
be the industrial reconversion and the reform 
of the labour market. Before paying atten-
tion on the second one, as the first one will be 
studied below, it is important to remark that 
during the socialist Governments days the so 
called State of Welfare policies are going to be 
consolidated. We will make below a reference to it as well. 
The labour reform, which was approved in Au-
gust 1984, meant a radical change as it boosted 
the temporary (fixed term) contracting model. The temporary contract type was already in-cluded on the Basic Bill of Employment dated 
in 1980, but the reform extended its range to any unemployed person, removing the former 
ceilings established in relation to the compa-
nies’ staff, being allowed to renew the contract every six months with a limit of three years. So, it does not lessen the value of the contracting 
causality only, but also it gives birth to one of 
the most important problems of the Spanish 
labour market by making a duality within this 
market with fixed and temporary employees, 
which has been aggravated then. The reform makes more precarious the employment, with-
out giving a permanent solution to the prob-lem of unemployment and with very long-term negative effects on productivity, as it causes a high level of temporary rotation and de-stimu-
lates the companies’ investment for employees training.  At the end of this period, several of the pro-
posed targets are done. The imbalance of the 
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balance of payments is corrected, nevertheless 
not due to an improvement of the trade bal-ance, as the imports grow up more than the 
imports, but thanks to an unstoppable growth of the tourism incomes and a short-time capi-
tal inputs. The inflation is significantly reduced 
and a modest grow of the GDP occurs. Not-withstanding the unemployment still increas-es: The rate arrives to a new maximum level in 1985 with 21.5% and three million of unem-ployed and only thirty thousand unemployed less in 1986, with a rate of 21%. During these 
four years the GDP per capita grows down in real terms. 
We set in 1986 the beginning of a new period, which ends in 1993 with a new economic crisis in 1993. These are a few years during which 
the economic growth comes back, boosted on 
a great part by the entrance in the so called then European Economic Community. In 1985 
a Government renewal had taken place due to internal disagreements with the leaving of 
Miguel Boyer, substituted by Carlos Solchaga. A few days earlier, in June 12th, the Accession 
Treaty to the European Community had been 
signed. In accordance to it Spain, beside Portu-
gal, was going to become a new member since January 1st 1986, closing so a negotiation pro-
cess which had started in 1983, just after the 
arrival to the Government.  As it is known, 1986 is the key for the future of 
what will be the European Union, as in Febru-
ary the European Unique Act is signed by all 
the twelve members of the European Econom-
ic Union. We can summarize in four objectives: 
• Set January 1st 1993 as the date to get an 
actual European single market, by remov-
ing all the bonds to the free mobility for goods and factors (work and capital). 
• Extend the action field to areas like mon-etary cooperation and the environmental mean policies, Research and Development (R+D), energy and so on. 
• Assume the need to deepen on economic and social cohesion.
• Increase the weight of the European Par-
liament and reform the decision making 
process, by increasing the amount of deci-
sions subject to a single majority and re-ducing the countries veto. The culminating process date was coincident 
with the one fixed to Spain by the Accession Treaty for concluding its tariff dismantling, of 100% in respect the EEC countries and the 
same tariffs as EEC country members to third countries. 
A very relevant fact just at the beginning of this period is that a referendum is going to take 
place in Spain by March 12th 1986 to decide 
about the permanence within the NATO, some-thing what made that Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Fernando Moran, resigned as the Government changed its position and supported the stay 
into the Organization. The polling question asked was seen as a tendentious one20. The re-sult was the approval of the stay with 52.5% 
of favourable votes but with a participation of 
59.42%. The main factors which influenced on 
the change of the Government position were, 
in accordance to the summary made by Santos 
Juliá, “the pressure made from United States 
and several European Countries; the relation-
ship between the stay into the NATO and the 
accession to EEC; and the favourable opinion of the Ministry of Defence to follow closely the 
links with the Alliance (Juliá, 1999; 266-267). It was also added to it the general idea that the 
exit from the NATO would be an imprudent position once the tension increased due to a second “Cold War” started in 1979 due to the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan.  But that is not all since during this period the design of an Economic and Monetary Union is 
going to start. The plan is approved just in Ma-drid in June 1989 and will culminate with the 
approval of the Maastricht Treaty in February 
1992. As the Government was then an enthu-siastic supporter to anything which meant Eu-
rope it decided to be integrated into the Euro-
pean Monetary System (established in March 1979 as a response to the worldwide crisis) 20 Among other things, no reference to the Organization 
of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), his real name, but to the “Atlantic Alliance” is made.
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but with a currency change (133.8 Pesetas = 1 ECU) what meant to overvalue the currency in respect to the rest of the European curren-cies and US Dollar. In order to contain the in-
flation and finance the deficit, the Peseta was 
put on the allowed fluctuation high band (6%). 
The impact of such a decision is not ignorable 
as it meant a strong damage on the balance of 
goods, higher than the one attributable due to the effect of the tariff dismantling, the suppres-
sion of fiscal protection to the imports and the 
fiscal subsidies to the exports in force at this time. Since then, the Spanish economic policy will consist of what is called “competitive de-
inflation”, it is to say, the convergence with 
countries with lower inflation rates, in particu-
lar with Germany.This period which some call the “integration 
cycle” and “accession cycle” by others, it is pos-
sible to split in two different stages, from the 
political economy point of view. The first one happens after the recovery of the two former years, an expansion remaining until the end of the decade. And the second one is an eco-
nomic slowdown time of the biennium 1990-
1992, a slowdown dissembled by the investor effort on the pomp of events which take place 
in 1992: Olympic Games in Barcelona, Univer-sal Exposition in Seville and the award to Ma-
drid as World´s Cultural Capital City. The pe-
riod is in general characterized by the fact that 
the Spain´s economic cycles are going to show since then an almost perfect synchrony with the rest of the European Union, notwithstand-
ing its profile is always going to be more re-
marked: Growing up better during the upward phases, growing down much more during the depressed phases.Spain had never grown up that much within a 
so short period of time. In seven years the GDP, 
in Pesetas of 1995, per capita and in absolute 
terms, grew up the double tan in 50´s, more 
than in 60´s and 70´s (but a little bit less in ab-solute terms). The accession to the European Economic Community is going to make that 
Spain becomes in an open economy, in change of a huge increase of the imports indeed and 
growing too the trade balance deficit. The 
growing incomes due to the tourism, but in special due to the long term capital inputs until 
1990 allowed a positive balance on the balance of payments. Nevertheless, the strong decrease of the latter since 1991 causes an enormous 
damage on the balance of payments which 
shows a negative balance in 1991 and 1992. 
There is a modest advance on inflation and 
public deficit. For what concerns to the infla-
tion measured by the Consumer Price Index, it is reduced in three percentage points, remain-
ing in 1992 on 5.8%. The General Government 
deficit is three percentage points reduced as well down to 4.0% in the same year. The unem-ployment rate has an important growth down 
until 1990 (see Figure 1), almost five percent-age points, despite there is still over 2.5 million of unemployed, to grow up then since 1991 up to its historical maximum top in 1994.There are several factors which will make 
an influence on the strong growth of this pe-riod, in particular related to the investments. 
We have the foreign capital flow to which we 
have already referred to, the fiscal stimulus to investment tax relief in production goods and 
the stimulus on the fall of energy´s prices. All 
of it makes that the contribution to growth on 
Gross Capital Formation´s GDP goes up to noth-
ing less than to 47.5% (See Table 1 below). The 
flows coming from the European funds are im-
portant as well. Figure 2 shows the funds flows coming from the European Union, the contri-
butions made by Spain, the balance between 
both and what it represents with regard to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The net posi-
Source: Royal Institute Elcano (2006) and own elabora-tion. 
Making a synthesis of this period García Del-gado wrote on the third edition of “Lessons of 
Spanish Economy” in 1997, using the data giv-
en by Prados until 1993:“Spain, at the end, which actual conver-gence with Europe – it is to say, in terms of welfare levels expressed in income per ha-
bitant – has been ´late´ along the time and 
still is ´incomplete´ (Comín), did not cease 
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to be a second class, a second line country within the Western Europe countries in-
dustrialization scene; a peripheral coun-try on this way too. (27). It is an economy of second range, on this meaning as well, 
which compared level of income per habi-
tant puts it at the same time between two southern-peripheral countries: Italy and 
Portugal, forming so a differenced sub-set in some meaning. (28).” So that,” once the 
formerly said has been considered it is 
impossible to understand the Spanish ex-perience as atypical within the European frame.  The Spanish path is, in other words, 
a fully European path and its “normality” 
(Carreras) is to be remarked in front of any 
try of finding either presumed radically 
specific elements or singular at all” (29).21
21 It is noteworthy that the introduction chapter of these 
Lessons in its last edition in 2015, written again by García 
Delgado, the same evaluation is reproduced but the word “peripheral” disappears.  And this is despite with occa-
sion of the Great Recession, starting in 2008, the special-
ized media and mass media defines Spain as a European 
periphery beside Portugal and Greece. For instance, Tor-
tella and Nuñez (2015; 577) consider that Spain belongs 
tive balance during these years means nearly half a point on the nominal GDP´s growth.  
Figure 2
Just to finish with this shallow analysis of the political economy on this period, it seems to 
be relevant to explain the social ambient sur-
rounding the PSOE´s Governments during 
the last years. A sentence said in 1986 by the Minister of Economy, Carlos Solchaga, gives light on what happened: “Spain is one of the 
countries where more and faster is possible to earn money”. During these years and contrary to what was expected, it was consolidated the 
culture of enrichment, of money´s glamour, of 
success, which produced a wonder but also 
social rejection (Fusi and Palafox, 1997; 395). 
The rejection to the economic policy drove the 
Unions to call for a general strike in December 18th 1988 which palsied Spain. And since 1990 
a serial of corruption cases which contributed 
to the PSOE´s fall started to be discovered. The 
cases of Juan Guerra (brother of the Vice-Prime 
Minister Alfonso Guerra), the case of Mariano 
Rubio, Governor of the Bank of Spain, the case 
of Luis Roldan, the first non-military Guardia 
Civil General Director involving the President 
of Navarre… And others scandals follow these 
in 1994: Those are the cases of GAL (a para-to the European periphery.
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police group created in the Ministry of Home 
Affairs to fight against ETA´s terrorism) and the papers of the Defence Intelligence Service or CESID (Defence Information High Central) which had spied to politicians and even to the 
King. All of it made an image of PSOE as a Party without ideas and without morality. In words 
by Fusi and Palafox (1997; 399): “Under the 
wings of the absolute majorities obtained in the Elections, the socialist power had derivate 
to a combination of caesarist-leadership, a prepotent policy, a Parliament devaluation and occupation of institutions”. On the light of the former, at the end of the pe-
riod and absolutely not denying the progress 
made and, among them: the extension of public 
resources with a wide income re-distribution, the fast improvement of the education level 
and the labour force qualification, the build-
ing of a federal type de-centralized State; the Spanish economy shows itself again as a sand-feet economy and society as all the structural 
problems are going to appear again with viru-lence with the crisis starting in 1993. So that, 
Spain it seems not to be a “typical” experience into the European frame, as said. But this is an-
other story not to be told here. 
To get a global overview and picture of what 
happened during the Franco´s Dictatorship as well as at the time of Democracy restoration, 
figure 3 shows the Gross Domestic Product 
levels (GDP) per capita in 1990 US Dollars in 
Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, compared with the average of 11 European countries since 1935 until 1993. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland 
and United Kingdom. As it can be seen, the GDP per capita in Spain falls down during the Civil 
War, recovering during the first part of 40´s when it falls in the rest of the countries as a 
consequence of the Second World War, with a 
deeper impact in Italy and Greece, but not so in Portugal. But after the Second World War it grows in all these countries whilst in Spain it 
falls until 1950, keeps stable during the whole 
decade and the drop caused by the Stabiliza-
tion Plan of 1959 and 1960 can be seen. Since then it does constantly grow up to its top in 
1978, keeping more or less stable until 1987 
reflecting the impact of the entry in the Euro-
pean Union to come back to drop under the di-rect hit of 1993 crisis.  
Figure 3
Source: Own elaboration from The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 
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2013 version. Data are in Geary-Khamis USD in 1990. Index 100 corresponds to the average of 11 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
United Kingdom.And now, three additional comments: First of all, it does surprise that, with the exception of 
the two years impact of the Stabilization Plan 
during the above mentioned years, in all the 
rest of the serial Spain is always above Greece 
and Portugal but is getting farther from Italy. 
It must be mentioned at this stage that in ac-cordance to this data source Spain does not re-cover its per capita income of 1935 until 1954. Compared with the average of the eleven Euro-pean countries it will not recover such a level until 1971. As a contrast the European average 
to come back to levels previous to the war was 6 years. As a second comment, Spain never overcomes the 70% of these eleven countries compared with.  If we had included United States in this 
graphic, something we avoid not to break the scale, we could see this country is all along the period over 100 with an amazing grow in the 
first half of 40´s and arriving in 1945 up to GDP per capita of 268% of the eleven European 
countries, starting then a drop until beginning 
of 60´s, being stable on 133% of the average in 1993. And the third comment, an important method-
ological clarification since data base referred 
to Spain might be undervalued as Naredo 
(1991) has noticed related to 40´s of the past Century when analysing three revisions of the 
official GDP figures and offering his own one. 
Such an undervaluation is imputed by Naredo 
to two different factors: The first one is the un-critical sense of historians, who did not detect a set of incoherencies on their estimations, 
reducing the figures from the official ones to 
justify so with data a presumed dictatorship economic policy downfall during these years, mixing up political opinions and economic in-terpretations. And the second one is the cor-
set imposed by the dominant economic theory and its accounting derivatives which does not allow coming to the complementary and mea-
surable information sources, like physical, de-
mographic and territorial aspects when the statistic information is poor or limited. But 
specially, the accounting aggregate must be lo-cated on their social and institutional context. 
The importance of the black market can´t be ignored as well as the added value generated 
by it related to consumption products and in-dustrial products as well, “when the estrap-
erlo22 was one of the main enrichment sources 
on the post-war economy” (Naredo, 1991; 21). 
The same might be said about estimations re-
lated to 80´s which do not take into account the 
incomes generated by realizations of movables and real estate capital gains. So, in front of al-
ternative estimations to the officials in 40´s 
which even give a drop on GDP per active indi-
viduals, Naredo´s estimation is an increase of a medium annual average growth rate of 2,1%.  
22 “Estraperlo” is a term that comes from uniting the names of Strauss and Perlo, promoters of a rigged rou-
lette that caused a scandal in 1935, which brought down 
the government of the Republic of then, being associated 
to the widespread black market that characterizes the 
40’s (Clavera, 1976).
Source: L. Prados (2003) and own elaboration.Facing to get an overview of the productive structure transformations in Spain, the Figure 
4 shows the GDP distribution per economic sectors. Looking to it we can make the follow-
ing reflections: First, the preponderance of Ser-vices along the whole analysed period, which overcome the 50% during the Civil War and increases again since 1970. But in the whole 
period it never drops down below 40%. Sec-
ond, just during the years when Services par-ticipation drop these correspond to the growth of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing which 
arrives to its top in 1944, reflecting the process 
of the rural life expansion of both the Spanish 
economy and society during 40´s, with ups and downs on the second half of the decade, start-
ing then an unstoppable way down since 1952. 
The hunger and misery on 40´s are going to 
drive a lot of families to be back in villages and small towns as a livelihood. Furthermore, the falangist idea to transform Spain in a country 
of small agricultural people must be added to the formerly said, despite it is necessary to re-mark that during these years the power of the great landowners was consolidated. And third, 
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Figure 4
the increase of the relative importance of the Industry since 1945, arriving up to its top in 
1965 with some stability until 1974, starting then to lose economic weight. As a last com-ment, Construction and Civil Works increase their importance along the period with ups and downs and never overtaking the 10% of 
the GDP, being the final years of the period when arrives to a higher relative importance. This evolution of the Spanish economy sectori-
al structure is confirmed if data of employment are used, with a few nuances, as the employ-ment within the Services sector represents over 60% of the total employment at the end of the period, starting it decrease since middle 
of 50´s, whilst Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-ing sectors which mean 50,5% in 1940 will 
not lose its relative importance until the end 
of 50´s, collecting roughly a 9% of the employ-ment still in 199323. 
23 It has been argued that the increased weight of ser-
vices does not hold if the composition of GDP at constant prices is analysed. “In 1959, the set of activities encom-passed under this name (...) was, at constant 1986 prices, 47.6 per 100 of the total. In 1973, the proportion had not 
only increased; it had dropped half a point to 47.1 The seven points of the nominal increase vanish when tak-
ing into consideration the inflation rate”. But if the data 
of Prado (2003) on the deflators of GDP at factor cost by 
industry are used and the deflator of services are cal-
culated relative to the GDP deflator and the deflator of 
industry, throughout the period the deflator of services 
is always below the industry, although the former does not stop falling since 1953, while the second continues to grow since 1963.
Table 1
Expenses components contribution to GDP´s growth
GDP´s growth rate Private consump-tion contribution, % Public consump-tion contribution, % Gross capital for-mation contribu-tion, % Net exports con-tribution, %1944-1952 2.18 99.80 -28.90 41.40 -12.301952-1958 4.55 76.10 7.10 40.00 -23.201958-1964 6.70 59.00 5.90 27.80 7.401964-1974 6.93 65.90 6.00 35.30 -7.201974-1978 3.21 71.80 17.70 -14.70 25.201978-1986 2.17 63.40 31.80 -6.80 11.501986-1992 4.43 60.70 27.90 47.50 -36.00
Source: Taken from Prados (2003; Table 6.4).
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It is also interesting to learn which have been the engines of the economic growth, in mac-
roeconomics terms, so that the Table 1 disag-
gregates those factors contributing either on 
a positive or negative way to the GDP growth, 
in accordance to the economic cycles used by Prados (2003) on this respect.  We want to 
remark, first of all, how the public consump-
tion brings a very negative, and very small afterwards, until 1974, what could give an 
idea about the little size and economic fall 
upon economy of General Government during 
Franco´s time. Secondly, the important con-
tribution of the Gross Capital Formation, it is 
to say, the investment during Franco´s time, 
which becomes negative when the 1973 crisis 
starts. It will be recovered with the entry in Eu-ropean Economic Community. 
And thirdly, the negative contribution of the foreign trade, which it is positive only in the period 1974-1976. In almost sixty years only in two (1944 and 1960) the exports over-come the imports, what it gives an idea of the important foreign restrictions of the Spanish economy24. Furthermore, if data of Balance on Current Account and Capital are analysed, the 
inputs of tourism, the remittances made by the migrants and the long term capital inputs are 
those which make that balance is positive, nev-ertheless not during the whole period we are analysing. Between 1949 and 1982, as well as in the periods of two years 1965-1966, three years 1974-1976, in 1982 and in the four years 
1991-1994 the balance will be negative, show-
ing the big limits of the economic policy applied in every former period. Already in 1959 one of 
the Stabilization Plan measures was a Peseta´s devaluation intending to correct the strong un-
balances of the foreign sector, putting it at the 
Exchange of 60 Peseta for 1 USD. In November 1967 it was necessary to resort to a new deval-uation, this time down to 69 Peseta for 1 USD. New devaluations will take place in 1976 and 
1977, being the latter the most important one 
as a consequence of the adjustments measures contained in the Covenants of Moncloa, arriv-
ing down to 87.3 Pesetas for 1 USD on buys and 97.5 on sales. The next devaluation will take 
24 As per imports and exports rebuilding made by Anto-nio Tena in Carreras and Tafunell (2005).
place when PSOE comes to the Government in 
1982, being the exchange 127.1 Pesetas for 1 
USD. Finally, within the period subject to this 
study, a new devaluation fixed the exchange on 139.76 Pesetas for 1 USD.  In this short evaluation of the economic policy of this period, it is important to know how the 
distribution of the rent has been. To size the 
inequality and the poverty, the most suitable information source are the polls to the homes, 
but unfortunately the only available reliable data for Spain are those from the Families Budget Poll dated 1973-1974, despite there are data from former years and different polls 
(Ayala, 2016; 18-23).  
Due to it and first of all, we came to the cal-
culation made by Prados for a long period as shown on Figure 5, representing two mea-surements25. On one hand, an index of Gini 
built by Prados (2008) based on National Ac-
counts data about the functional distribution 
of income among labour incomes and property incomes (left side scale), on which it is com-
bined the inequality within every group with 
inequality among intra-groups. On the other hand, the participation of the one per thou-sand of the population (the highest incomes) in respect the total incomes (right hand scale,) 
with data obtained from tax registers by Al-
varedo and Sáez (2009). We are interested on 
what happened during the period object of 
this work, since 1935 until 1993, because the Figure 5 starts in 1929 and ends in 2000. In 
respect of the data by Prados, after a strong 
reduction of the inequality during the Second 
Republic time, at the first few years of the next decade the tendency is reversed, despite that it happens with ups and downs, to which no ex-planation is made, to increase drastically since 
the end of 40´s and beginning of 50´s. The last 
two thirds of 50´s show a very important fall down which, with an upturn due to the conse-
quences of the Stabilization Plan, goes continu-ing until the crisis of 1967. Since then there is 
a relative stability, which starts to fall down since the Democracy restoration, with an up-
turn again with the crisis of 1979. In the 80´s 
25 We thank Professor Prados de la Escosura for provid-
ing us with his original data, allowing to draw the figure.
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the inequality falls down again, until the crisis in 1993 makes it to increase on an important way.
Figure 5
Spain´s Long Term Inequality
Source: Alvaredo and Sáez (2006) and Prados (2008: 302).
The data by Alvaredo and Sáez show a deeply different evolution. A continued growth down 
of highest incomes participation since the be-
ginning of the Dictatorship until the first years 
of the 50´s, a certain stability since then (de-
spite there are just a few years on its estima-tion) and an opposite evolution than shown 
by the Prados data since 1981. Such a differ-ent evolution makes Prados to say that the in-
equality evolution in Spain is not influenced by 
the capital incomes concentration changes, but 
by the growth on property incomes participa-tion in the total income26.From Prados point of view, the growth of in-
equality on functional incomes distribution at 
the first time of the Dictatorship is due to a po-
larization between labour inputs and capital 
26 For a short but illustrative description of methodologi-
cal problems on the kind of estimations made by Prados, see Ayala (2016). 
inputs, since the scarce factors, land and capi-
tal, were themselves favoured by the economic 
policy at expense of the labour factor, which 
was distributed on a more equitable way. The 
relevant decrease of inequality since 1953 
would be the result of the acceleration of the 
economic growth with better life conditions, 
the urbanization process and the increase of 
the labour incomes participation in the nation-
al income. Since the beginning of the 60´s the 
decrease of the inequality, with the said ups 
and downs, it would be due to the economic growth, with an increase of savings, as well as to the increasingly access to the home owner-ship, which reduced the property incomes, the increase of the education levels, the moderate 
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growth of the social expenses and the decrease of the regional inequalities.  With the restoration 
of the Democracy the social expenses for pensions and unemployment benefits, as well as the cur-
rent expenses and investment on education and health grew, beside the decentralization process, 
something which impelled new inequality decreases.
Figure 6
Source: Alcaide (1999), Barómetro Social de España (www.barometrosocial.es)  and own elaboration.As a second point, and using data coming from the home polls, we can see on Figure 6 the 
evolution of the incomes personal distribu-
tion between 1964 and 1993. Unfortunately, we have only data related to individual years 
from diverse families’ budgetary surveys and 
just a continuous series on the period 1985-1990 from the Continuous Families Budgetary 
Survey. Anyway, we can get an idea about the 
very unequal income distribution during the last years of the Dictatorship. The restoration 
of the Democracy attains a substantial reduc-
tion, which is obvious and continued after the arrival of PSOE to the power, despite the crisis 
is going to make an small increase of inequal-
ity which will be kept along the further years.27
In order to complete the income distribution and economic magnitudes perspective, it is in-teresting in our view to show the evolution of 
27 It must be taken in account that these data refer to the 
disposable income, it is to say, after taxes and transfers 
from the State. If we calculated the income inequality be-
fore the activity from the State, the Gini index in Spain 
will substantially higher. 
the enterprises profits. We have for it the in-
vestigation by Tafunell (1998) on the period 1880-1981, nevertheless it is referred only to the large companies. The Figure 7 shows the 
profits annual variations which, surprisingly, it is negative only in 1936 and nearly zero in 1959 and 1963, despite it shows consider-
able ups and downs during the whole period. 
It strikes that the profit growth rates during 
this period are not only positive but they are even high in certain years. In fact, during the period 1940-1950 the average rate is 5.38% whilst the Spanish economy faced to very se-
vere restrictions. As remarked by Tafunell (1998), the economic atony did not impede 
the earning of high enterprises profits. “Just the contrary, the same factors which made 
the first – quotas, imports licenses, goods ap-praisals, new investments authorizations, and so on – made the perverse effect of increasing 
disproportionately the established companies’ 
margins” (Tafunell, 1998; 734). During 50´s 
the profits are high, with a growth average rate 
of 10.36%, which might be attributed to the 
liberalizing measures, despite the strong the 
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strong decrease in 1959 due to the Stabiliza-
tion Plan. During 60´s the growth comes down 
influenced by the strong decrease in 1963 and 
1967 to which it is not possible to find any explanation, as the Spanish economy is grow-ing a lot, nevertheless the average growth is 
5.36%. Since 1970 until 1981 the growth stops as the average rate of the period is 1.6%, what 
is a consequence of the 1973 crisis fall down (despite it is not easy to explain the fall down in 1971).  
Figure 7
Since the serial by Tafunell stops in 1981, we went to the Bank of Spain Balances Central, de-spite its coverage of Spanish companies is re-
duced (around 25% between 1982 and 1990, increasing up to 35% from 1991). The Figure 8 shows the growth rate of the total net result. 
The enterprises profit does not stop to fall down to a minimum level in 1993 despite that, 
by surprise, will get a strong recovery in 1994. 
The fall down is difficult to be explained bear-
ing in mind that the GDP shows a high growth 
rate as a consequence of the Spain´s accession to the Economic European Community: The 
GDP growth average rate between 1982 and 
1983 is 3.02% but the average in the period 1987-1990 is 5.22%. 
Just to finish this economic evaluation of the 
period subject to the analysis, we study now the evolution of the prices. We have used for it 
the GDP deflator data made by Prados (2003), shown in Figure 9, instead of a cost of living index or a consumer price index, as there is not a homogeneous series to these magnitudes for this period. 
In 1946, 1950 and 1976 the inflation is going 
to be over 20% a year with another important peak in 1956 when it arrives up to 15%. But 
meanwhile the inflationary episodes in 1946 
and 1950 are followed by a strong decreases, it 
is since 1969, no doubt, when it will not cease to increase year after year, up to the highest peak of the whole period, in 1976. And the explana-
tion to it is found on a joint of several factors. 
On one hand, during 40´s there is an imbalance 
between offer and demand as a consequence of the scarcity. On the other hand, there is a growth model, one of which characteristics 
is the way the economy was financed, in par-
ticular the pledging issuances of public debt until 1959 what increased the uncontrolled 
monetary mass and generating an inflation of demand28. In 70´s it is possible to explain due 
28 The automatic pledging, a system established in 1917, 
meant that the private Banks subscribed the public debt 
titles, sometimes on an obliged term due to the being of 
investment coefficients to finance the debt of the State and the INI as well. Those titles allowed to the Banks to get loans from the Bank of Spain on an almost automatic 
way at a “pledging” interest rate, which was fixed by the 
Ministry of Public Treasure and which was lower than 
Source: Tafunell (1998) and own elaboration.
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Figure 8
Source: Tafunell (1998) and own elaboration.
Figure 9
Source: Prados (2003) and own elaboration. to the exhaustion of the productive model and the economic policy applied during the last times of the Dictatorship, in special after the 1973 crisis, as salaries increase occurred as a 
way to peace the growing labour conflicts. It 
would be a structural inflation since the po-
litical conflicts were taken to the sphere of the 
companies as there was not suitable channels 
the rate applied by the Bank of Spain for granting loans to the private Banks.
for its reveal. It is also to be taken into account 
on this structural inflation the high degree of monopolistic economy and the service s sector rigidity. Only after the Covenants of Moncloa, 
after the restoring of the Democracy, the infla-
tion is being to be controlled, what it was one of their main goals, getting the target to make 
it descend until the 1993 crisis, but not with-out important upturns in 1982 and 1986.
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2. The economic role of the State 
in Spain, 1939-1993.It is now the turn to analyse on detail what we consider the three main economic perfor-
mance of the State during the Franco´s Dic-
tatorship. Our analysis will be based on the 
methodological purpose by Braña (2010). In accordance to it, the performance of the State 
is doubled as regulation and intervention prac-tices. The regulation practices are those trying to secure the production relationships general conditions of reproduction which, on every so-
cial formation, are not born from the autono-mous function of the market. The intervention 
practices can be of two types: direct interven-tion and indirect intervention. By direct one it is understood the fact that the State passes to 
be a direct goods and services producer, basi-cally via State-owned companies. As in-direct intervention it is understood any formal or in-
formal activity within the budgetary activity as, in certain historical times, these are made off the Budget in order to remove them from the control of the Parliament. It is necessary to re-mark that every intervention practice is linked to a previous or, at least parallel, regula-tory activity.
2.1. The regulation practices. We will start with the analysis of the regula-tion practices. The national ways to capitalism 
and, in particular the Spanish way adopted by 
the Franco´s regime, is going to be based on a strong regulation activity within the whole economic sphere. We will refer in this work to some of its most important reveals
In May 14th 1939 the basic products rationing starts and will not end until June 15th 1952. To it, in 1939 the Transport and Supplies Commis-
sariat (CAT) is established and will be extend-ed until 1981 when SENPA (National Service of Agrarian Products, de-pending of Ministry of Agriculture), takes the ownership of its goods although the provincial delegations remained until 1984. The CAT is provided with two main functions: The compilation and centralization of economic products seen as essential and 
their re-distribution via a rationing system. In 
1940 the Fees High Prosecutor´s Office is es-
tablished by the of Fees Law dated November 30th 1940, which target is to get the denuncia-tions related to violations committed against such a Law (sales of goods at higher prices than 
fixed, and so on) as well as to apply the subse-
quent penalties. The Fees High Prosecutor´s 
Office disappears by a Decree dated December 26th 1963. Since then all its inspection and sanctioning functions are passed to the Minis-try of Commerce and most particularly to its Market Discipline Inspection Service. 
The operating ways and the consequences of these regulations are well studied, as they will 
make since the beginning that a “black market” appears, what in Spain was called “estraperlo”, something to what we referred on the former section when we collected a few criticisms to 
the GDP calculations made by some authors. “The estraperlo is going not only to mean the 
sales at abusive prices, tricking so the legal 
commercial ways of food such a bread, olive 
oil, coffee or sugar, but also – for have been made due to the same reasons – the illegal sales of raw material or manufactured prod-ucts, as well as the corner of all kind of goods 
facing an artificial scarcity and with it the so 
coveted increase of prices, being all of them typical estraperlo activities” (Clavera, 1976; 91).  The practice of estraperlo will bring the 
parallel market, the so called black market, on which those goods which do not arrive to the legal market are commercialized.   Carlos Barciela is who has mostly studied the 
agrarian products black market (Bar-ciela; 
1986 and 1993) but estraperlo did not limit it-self to the agrarian products as it also affected 
to the cotton and wool by-products, the work-cattle raising, different metals and the fuel, tex-tile industry, paper industry and leather man-ufactures, among others not that much studied 
(Clavera, 1976; Catalán, 1994; 385). It is neces-
sary to re-mark that the Franco´s administra-tion kindness and its extension during many years made a social acceptation atmosphere, among producers and consumers, to a specula-tive capitalism which will arrive until our daysThe regulation also affected to the industrial 
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sector, being it the first regulated sector as early as in August 20th 1938, which is going 
to require a previous administrative authori-
zation factories plants installation and modifi-
cation. Such a request will be developed, just 
when the war is over, by the National Industry 
Defence and Regulation Law dated November 
24th 1939. Formerly and dated October 24th, New Industries of National Interest Law had 
been approved. It is a legislation which was al-
ready applied under the Primo de Rivera´s Dic-tatorship (1926-1930) and derogated under 
the Second Republic regime (1931-1936). Af-
ter the Stabilization Plan of 1959 the industri-
al investments regulation was liberalized and this policy continued until 1963. But in 1966 
became hard again and remained in force until its derogation in 1980. Pires (2005) for the pe-riod 1938-1963 and Buesa & Pires (2002) for the period 1963-1980 have studied with detail the effects of such legislation.   
It is proved during the first period that this regulation, which was introduced without 
the businessmen opinion, subjected the free industry to the interest of State, which policy 
consisted of getting the industrialization by fo-cussing the efforts on production goods. It was 
sometimes done against the businessmen but from time to time they got the “capture” of the State on those sectors which did not interfere 
in the targets of the Franco´s regime bureau-
cracy, by using to it the existing legislation fac-
ing the creation of barriers to the entrance of new competitors (Pires, 2005).On the second period the legislation goals changed and looked for a solution to the small size of the industrial facilities and reducing so the intensity of the regulations. By surprise, the most deeply regulated sectors were those 
with less problems of small size showed, be-
sides the dynamics of establishments did not 
depend of industries installation and modifica-tion policy. In the case of the most of the indus-tries which marketing structure was designed as oligopolistic, the regulation was deeply in-tense with the peculiarity that, anyway, within 
the group of dominant industries those be-longing to the National Industry Institute were 
in. It does mean that this regulating policy was linked to the direct intervention policy through the State-owned companies, which were one 
of the most used instruments by the Franco´s 
regime to try to become the country in an in-
dustrial one, being one of its targets to hold under control the private enterprises (Buesa & Pires, 2002). Just to summarize, to explain that the restric-
tions to the enterprises establishment, which started with the rules of 1939, could extend for more than two decades, the usual arguments related to the political ideology and the ruling class economic concepts are not enough. For 
instance, to Miranda (2003; 12), its endurance 
is also due to the individual businessmen in-
terest already established in the market, lim-iting so the competence and reinforcing the 
monopolistic degree on many branches of the production. Another regulation practice was the Develop-ment Plans which we already have referred to, 
remarking that they were based on the French 
indicative planning model. The work by De la 
Torre & García-Zúñiga (2012), has shed new light on the design of plans and its effects over the production structure. It is necessary to start remarking that, like with regard to so 
many works about what happened with the 
economic policy during the Franco´s regime, 
such a policy has been blamed from a politi-cal -and sometimes a moral- criteria, in special 
whether the researchers are, let’s say, liberal. It is general the opinion on the way that it could 
not be any other thing than perverse, so that 
the economic growth was possible despite and no thanks to the interventionism from the 
State. Well, the first thing reminded by De la 
Torre & García-Zúñiga is that the planning in 
Spain was just a late reflection of what was be-ing tried in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War, where it was used as 
a general way. The difference would be that 
in these countries the goal was to combine 
growth and equity, in particular by reducing 
the regional imbalances, whilst the equity was never a goal in the Spanish case.    Furthermore, the adoption of the indicative 
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planning followed the recommendations from the international entities which advised to the 
technocrats of Franco´s regime after the Sta-
bilization Plan. Martín Aceña & Comín (1991; 
298), remarked that the report by   the Inter-national Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-opment (IBRD) dated in 1962, recommended 
the indicative planning as the most suitable programming model. On the other hand, De 
la Torre & García-Zúñiga prove that the same recommendation was included in the report 
made by the Organization for Economic Co-op-eration and Development (OECD), which even supervised the planning and provided techni-
cal assistance at Spanish Government request. At the time of evaluate the planning results, 
De la Torre & García-Zúñiga remind that these 
type of policies need between 20 and 25 years. These researchers are focused on the impact 
produced by one of the planning instruments addressed to promote the industrialization, the “poles” of development. The conclusion of 
this research are, first of all, that such a policy deepened on a progressive way on the award-ed provinces industrial growth, improving 
their industrial fabric, bringing such a growth at a higher level than the rest of the provinces. Nevertheless, the selection of these provinces were made more under political criteria than economic ones. Secondly, thanks to this policy 
the large enterprises in the country got public 
resources to finance their investments, result-ing so a “companionship” capitalism, to which 
a speculative capitalism born with the black market was summed. But in some cases the 
supplier small/medium size companies’ con-
solidation was boosted, the so called auxiliary company sector, amplifying the effect of the industrial district.  Additionally, the develop-ment poles made the strategy of the European multi-national enterprises to penetrate in the 
Spanish market to be stronger, showing so a clear long-term vision29. 
To finish with the analysis of a few of them, 
29 A quite detailed analysis and not made until then about the intervention of the State in the industry and address-
ing the issue of the power relations, as well as their bud-
getary cost can be found on Chapter III by Braña, Buesa & Molero (1984).
we believe the main regulating practices dur-ing the period of the Dictatorship, it is neces-sary to make a reference to the foreign trade 
control policy, by mean of the establishment of 
imports quotas and licenses. And related to the foreign trade, the policy of currencies exchange placed to the Spanish Foreign Currency Insti-tute, depending of the Ministry of Industry, taken away from the Bank of Spain, to support the industrial policy, so that only those goods 
seen as convenient by the Government were to 
be imported or exported. To it, during the first twenty years, the Peseta was systematically 
overvalued to difficult the exports, assum-ing a multiple exchange system with diverse rates depending of the goods, what once again 
brought a favourable treatment behaviour and 
a companionship. Notwithstanding, just as a 
mention, it is not to be forgotten the banking 
regulation which consolidated since the begin-
ning of the Dictatorship the banks power and its oligopolistic character30.All these and other regulation policies re-mained on their most interventionist version 
until the controlled liberalization started in 1957 and arrives up to its top point with the 
Stabilization Plan, although in 60´s and until the end of the Dictatorship a retreat will take place. With the restoration of the Democracy, 
when liberal and social-democrat economists arrive to the economic policy execution organi-
zations, the regulation net starts to be removed. 
There is an extended view on the way that lib-
eralizing is better than intervention, since the intervention was not good as it was associated 
to the Dictatorship. And furthermore the influ-
ence of the anti-Keynesian stream, monetarist, 
starts to be extended at the University´s educa-tion and the economic institutions, in special the Bank of Spain, where economists trained in North American universities are coming, those in which the theory of “rational” expectations 
is being gestated. It is true that the oligopolistic 
30 A summary of the power circles during the Franco´s 
regime, in particular the Banks can be seen on Biescas (Chapter V Biesca & Tuñón de Lara, 1980) mentioning 
the relevant bibliography. More recent and handling 
too the relevant bibliography can be found on Valdaliso (2004).
sectors, consolidated during the dictatorship, 
such as the electric or banking, will maintain unchanged a regulatory environment clearly 
favourable to their interests, obtaining what is called the “capture” of regulator. On the other hand, as we will see furtherly, the intervention 
from the State is going to be mostly done by 
mean of the indirect way, with a substantial in-
crease of the budgetary activity.We cannot end this section on regulatory poli-
cies without reference to the impact and influ-ence of the accession of Spain to the European 
Economic Community. This influence comes 
not only from the original or primary law, but 
from a quantitatively more important form of secondary law, which has affected not only the 
Government of Spain, but also the Autonomous Communities. On economic issues, the main 
exponent of this influence is the incorporation of the Maastricht Treaty, which comes out of the period under study, as well as those man-
dates referring to the financial system, to ser-
vices and freedom of establishment, as well as to the compliance with competition rules re-lated to the completion of the internal market.
2.2. The direct intervention. The role of 
the State-owned enterprise. The second type of the policies executed in 
Spain, since the beginning of the Dictatorship 
until the first days of the Democracy, was done 
by mean of a very important direct interven-tion with the goal to get the industrialization. It 
must be remarked that after the Second World 
War the establishment of a managerial pub-
lic sector is boosted in the whole Europe, but nevertheless the intervention was addressed 
to activities under difficulties (subsidiarity purpose) and to those less attractive sectors 
for the private initiative, with an influence on 
the population´s level of life (complementarity purpose).In a work like this one, with limited space, it 
will be possible only to give a superficial over-view of the relevancy and transcendence of the direct intervention from the State via the 
State-owned enterprise, being a theme around 
which there is an abundant bibliography, get-
ting back to its background and origins with 
the beginning of the capitalist relationships domination in Spain. 
Within the period subject to this study, the most relevant part of the State-owned enter-
prises has its origin on the establishment of the National Industry Institute (INI) dated 
September 25th 1941 with the target, as de-
scribed in the legal text preamble, “to give form and  execution to the great industrial re-
surgence of our Nation which, by stimulating 
the private industry, boost the institution of new production sources and the extension of the existing ones, self-creating those that the interest of the National defence or the exigen-
cies of our Economy might require”. It has been 
much written about the in-spired base of this 
law on the one establishing the Italian IRI un-
der the fascist Government in that country. The truth is that there was a former experience of direct intervention from the State in Spain 
what, on the other hand, fulfilled the Span-
ish industrial bourgeoisie exigencies. Thus, it is not conceived as an instrument to State the 
Economy substituting so the private initiative, 
but as complement of them (Braña & Buesa, 
1981; 22). It responds to the vital need of re-vitalize the National Economy and the leaders 
remark since the beginning that it looks for 
hold and boost a close cooperation with the 
private initiative, by mean of investments and 
joint activities within mixed companies, fore-seeing where appropriate the privatizing of the companies. Its creation is therefore framed 
in the objective of import substitution indus-trialization31.It is true that INI will not limit itself to the es-
tablishment of new companies to pro-mote di-
rectly the production and, sometimes, to sub-stitute the private initiative, as it even makes 
a competitive sector which contributed to give solutions to the Spanish economy constric-tions.
31 This is acknowledged by Martín Aceña and Comín 
(1990; 30), who write one of the most complete histo-ries of INI, arriving until 1990. In addition, as Braña and 
Buesa (1981; 21) remember, similar institutions are to 
be created in Latin America in the 1940s, in the context of external vacuum that favours the processes of import 
substitution industrialization30
It is important to note that the direct inter-vention of the State, during the Dictatorship 
and later, will not be confined to the INI, since 
throughout the period there will be other holding companies, attached to various minis-
tries, such as the Treasury, Agriculture, Public Works, on which several companies depend. 
There has also been a public banking system, after nationalizing several credit institutions in 1962 (including the Bank of Spain, until then a private entity), which will disappear in 1997, with the privatization of the last entity32. 
To give two very significant examples, the first is the railway network which was nationalized 
in 1941 and RENFE was established33. The oth-er one is the National Telephone Company of 
Spain, a private company established in 1924, 
with a majority of North American capital (ITT), which is granted the monopoly of tele-phony and it is an atypical case, since in 1945 
it becomes controlled by the State when it ac-
quired 79.6% of the shares owned by ITT, the 
rest being held by private individuals, since it 
had been listed on the Stock Exchange since its 
inception. To these cases must be added two 
monopolies, tobacco and oil, which are to be 
managed by private companies, although un-der the control of  the State 34.And already under restored Democracy a 
broad Regional-owned enterprise sector (Au-tonomous Communities) will appear, as we are going to see, apart from the existing Provinces 
and Local Councils net of public enterprises.
Focusing now on the INI, in a first stage, which 
can be dated between 1951 and 1963, it will 
32 Only the Official Credit Institute remains, a public fi-nancial institution that grants long-term loans for invest-
ment projects, but does not have branches.
33 It will group all private companies with Iberian rail-road track, greater than the European width. In the dicta-torship of Primo de Rivera, in 1926 an organization was created, EFE, that assumed the management of the pri-
vate lines that had passed to the State after its bankrupt-cy. With the creation of RENFE this company managed to manage only the lines of European width (narrow track). In 1965 it is renamed as FEVE, an Autonomous Organism that will manage the entire narrow railroad track net-work, assuming all other remaining narrow track lines, 
following its bankruptcy at the beginning of that decade.
34 The Tobacco Leasing Company (CAT) and the Petrol Monopoly Leasing Company (CAMPSA).
have a prominent role, making the most ambi-
tious projects and establishing the main com-panies, which will last until their dismantling 
in the 90’s. Starting in the 60’s, it will also 
become in what has been called a “hospital” 
of companies, by playing a subsidiary role, at 
the service of private initiative, absorbing and 
nationalizing companies with problems and socializing their losses. In 1974, a new stage 
will be opened, in which an attempt is made to return to INI a greater initiative, introducing 
business management criteria. But between 1975 and 1979, in spite of the introduction of 
business management, state-owned enterpris-
es are immersed in a generalized crisis, badly 
affected by the economic crisis, predominat-
ing their role as hospital of business, trying to use them for industrial and anti-cyclical policy purposes in the context of the economic crisis, 
including the fight against unemployment35. 
Between 1979 and 1983, a forward flight oc-curred, taking on new private companies in crisis and entering new activities without adapting their productive structures. In this period, the INI was cut off from the hydrocar-
bons sector, as the National Institute of Hydro-
carbons is established in 1981.
Coinciding with the beginning of the policy 
of industrial conversion, between 1983 and 
1995 a process of restructuring and financial reorganization of the State-owned enterprise 
began, with privatizations or “disinvestments”, trying to accentuate the competitive purpose of the INI. In this sense, in 1988 a legal modi-
fication takes place that will redefine the func-tions of the INI, introducing the criteria of 
profitability and efficiency in the allocation of resources. This process will culminate in the following years, with the arrival of the Popular Party (PP) in 1996, until the almost complete disappearance of the State-owned companies 
dependent from the Central Government, with 
a privatization based fundamentally on ideo-logical criteria more than on economic ones.
35 It should be noted that the Spanish Constitution of 
1978 includes the possibility of public entrepreneurship (Article 128.2), which is also envisaged for the Autono-mous Communities (Art. 148.1) and for Local Corpora-tions.31
It is not possible to give a complete picture of the importance of the State-owned enter-prise sector in Spain for the entire period of this study. Until 1989, only partial data exist, since it is not until that year that the Ministry 
of Finance prepares and publishes the inven-tory and accounts of such a sector. For this rea-
son and in what it follows below, we will give some information that can give an idea of the direct activity of the State in the production, 
not including in the same the public financial sector. Figure 10 shows the importance of State-owned enterprises in Spain in compari-son with the European Union, taking as an in-dicator the participation in non-agricultural employment. It does strike that throughout the 
period covered by the data, the State-owned enterprise sector is smaller in Spain than in Europe, although the temporal evolution is almost the same. The difference is that the re-
duction of its size starts earlier in Spain, by the 
middle of 80´s. 
Figure 10
Source: Comín and Díaz (2004; 184 and 267) and own elaboration.
Figure 11 shows the INI investment activity 
between 1946 and 1989, putting it in relation 
to the total investment of the Central Govern-
ment and with the Gross Capital Formation. 
The enormous importance of INI’s investment 
activity can be seen, with two peaks in 1965 and 1980 and not falling until the mid-1980s, 
when the restructuring process began. It is 
also significant the participation in the Gross Formation of Capital, with a parallel evolution to that of the participation in the investment.Figure 12 shows the sectorial importance of 
INI-Holding activity in the 50’s and 60’s; and 
since 1963 of the INI-Group of companies, highlighting the importance of the electricity 
and gas sector. It should be noted that partici-
pation in the oil sector disappears in the 80’s, when the new holding company, the National 
Hydrocarbons Institute (INH) was established, to which all oil companies are transferred.
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Figure 11
Source: Martín Aceña y Comín (1991) and own ealboration.
Figure 12
Source: Martín Aceña y Comín (1991; 47-48) and own elaboration.
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Figure 13 shows the number of companies 
on which INI has participated between 1942 
and 1989, with a breakdown of their capital 
shareholding: total, majority, minority and in-
direct. It can be verified that from the mid-50’s onwards there are many more companies in which it participated indirectly (given as there is no data for 1980, we have assumed that the 
number of companies is similar to that of five years earlier). In the period as a whole, INI 
shared the 100% in 178 companies, of which 
between 1942 and 1961, 18 corresponded to 
its role as “business hospital”, while between 1971 and 1983 the companies to which the so-called “socialization of losses” took place 
were 27, having to absorb private companies 
in bankruptcy36.
36 Martín Aceña y Comín (1991): p. 145, table 16, p. 508; 
table 19 and data provided in page 475.
Figure 13
Source: Martín Aceña y Comín (1991; 35. Cuadro 1) and own elaboration.
Figure 14
Source: “El sector público empresarial”, IGAE, varios años, Contabilidad Nacional and own elaboration.
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Figure 14 shows the importance of the entire 
public business sector since, in 1966, they be-gan to prepare their accounts in terms of Na-
tional Accounts. Three indicators have been applied: the share of gross value added in 
GDP, wages and salaries and employment. In all three cases, participation was relevant and 
growing until the mid-1980s, reflecting the loss of importance since 1993, when the priva-tization process is at its peak. 
And figure 15 shows the number of State-
owned companies of all the General Govern-ment institutions, disaggregating the investees 
by the Central Government, the Autonomous Communities, the Provinces and the city coun-
cils. It can be verified that, when from 1992 
onwards the Central Government begins to de-tach itself from State-owned companies, that is 
when companies belonging to the Autonomous 
Communities and the City Councils begin to take importance, a process that will continue intensively until today. This is a peculiar pro-
cess of decentralization, which has been called 
the “flight of administrative law”, the flight of the Budget, which implies loss of control of the representatives of citizens on regional and lo-
cal public activity, given that these companies 
are ruled by private law (Pascual, 2010).
Figure 15
Source: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado and own elaboration.
As has been pointed out, since the mid-1980s, with the arrival of the PSOE government, the 
process of dismantling the public business 
sector begins. Although there is a relevant epi-sode, the expropriation of a holding company, 
Rumasa, which was subsequently privatized, not without serious irregularities. The policy 
of PSOE’s governments consisted, first of all, 
in a process of financial consolidation, recon-version and rationalization. The reorganiza-tion of the companies was continued through the formation of sectorial groups within the main holding companies. The cost of these 
processes was substantial, as shown in figure 16, which refers exclusively to INI companies. 
Such a cost meant 30.2% of the non-financial 
deficit in 1989, in terms of cash, related to the 
Central Government. And 165,000 million pe-
setas must be added to it dur to the dismissal of 102,000 workers37.
37 An assessment of the total cost of industrial reconver-
sion and its consequences, in Buesa and Molero (1998; 
284 et seq.).35
Figure 16
Source: Martín Aceña y Comín (1991; p. 595, table 56; and p. 597, table 58).
Figure 17
Source: Myro (1993); IGAE, “El sector público empresarial” (several years) and own elaboration.
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After a long period of accumulated losses, spe-
cially of the companies belonging to the INI, 
there were only two years of back to profits. 
For due to the crisis of the 90’s, the accounts of State-owned companies resent again, as 
shown on figure 17. Hence, since then the em-
phasis was placed on the liquidation of compa-
nies of doubtful viability and on the privatiza-
tion of the profitable ones or of those that, by 
that way, could come to have benefits. “Priva-
tization thus became the natural outcome of a rationalizing policy of the State-owned sector 
in which the main objective was to ensure that the companies integrated in it competed on an 
equal footing with the private sector” (Buesa 
and Molero, 1998; 256). By stripping public 
enterprises of any justification based on social 
or public interest objectives, among them as instruments of industrial policy, insisting that 
they should behave and be evaluated under the 
same criteria as private companies, profitabil-
ity and profits, it ended up questioning their permanence within the State-owned sector.Once the privatization process started, as 
shown on figure 18, the obtained revenue was 
2.3. Indirect intervention. The role of 
the public administration budget.
Indirect intervention through budgetary ac-tivity is the third pillar on which State activ-
ity is based. In the case of Spain this form of 
intervention will be minimal for a good part 
of the dictatorship, but always within a to-tal magnitude of “underdeveloped” country, which is linked to a regressive tax system and 
very low fiscal pressure, rotten by the fraud. Prados (1996, 366-367) has pointed out that one of the differential characteristics of Spain with respect to Western Europe in economic 
Figure 18
Source: 1985-1994. Ortiz Villajos (2003); 1995-1999, Consejo Consultivo de Privatizaciones (2014); and own elabora-tion.
scarce. Only with the policy of massive privati-
zation executed by the Popular Party govern-ment in 1996 and for a short period of time, did 
significant revenues begin to emerge, although 
during the first half of the 90’s the result of the privatizations was a decline of the share of 
public companies in the Stock Market, which came down from 16.65% in 1992 to 10.87% 
in 1996, continuing the decline in subsequent years.
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policy is the application of a pre-Keynesian 
fiscal policy: “In fact, Franco’s cabinets kept 
orthodox ideas about a balanced Budget and 
the control of public expenditure (which was 
achieved in the 1950’s), while sticking to eco-nomic nationalism and intervention. In fact, nether full employment nor income redistri-
bution policies were enforced in the post-Civil War era. Under autarchy, the government did 
not contribute to raising effective demand by 
establishing unemployment benefits, no pro-gressive income tax was applied, and auto-
matic stabilizers were not introduced until the 
50’s. Government budget expenditure on pub-lic works, education, health, housing and social 
insurance was of little significance in the post-Civil War years”.
Comín (1996) makes reference to regula-
tion as the affordable instrument for the poor Treasuries, mainly due to the rigidity, scarcity, 
of public revenues. Thus, there would be an 
inverse relationship between regulation and 
indirect intervention by the State, through 
public revenue and expenditure policies, the 
Public Treasury. For the analysis of these poli-cies, there is an enormous amount of studies 
and reports, which have begun to be published 
since the mid-1950s and which are impossible 
Figure 19
Source: Comín (1996a) and own elaboration.
to account for in this essay 38.
38 The best and most detailed analysis of the Public Fi-
nance of franquism and democracy periods, in numerous 
works, is Francisco Comín and his collaborators, espe-
cially in Comín (1996b), who studies, in a historical per-
spective, the various public policies and not only the pub-
lic budget. For the period 1936-1959 can be consulted, 
being his most recent work, Comín and Martorell (2013).
Figure 19 shows the evolution in the long 
term of Spain’s public expenditure compared 
to Germany, Italy, France and the United King-
dom. It is quite clear that the State in Spain corresponds to an “underdeveloped” periph-
eral economy, and that it has only begun to ap-proach the central countries since 1975, and there is still a great distance in that year.
Nevertheless, we will start by analysing public 
revenues. Figure 20 shows the tax collection 
in Spain from 1940 to 1995, both for the Cen-
tral Government (CG) and for General Govern-
ment (GG). There is a slight increase in the Cen-
tral Government’s fiscal ratio (Tax / GDP) after the civil war, related to war delays and then falls to a low of 8.46 per cent in 1951. With a 
small rebound in 1965, after a fiscal reform in 1964, it is not until 1975 that revenue collec-
tion begins to grow, particularly following the 
fiscal reform that accompanies from its begin-
38
nings to the recovery of democracy. If we look 
at the GG tax collection, from 1958 to 1967 it 
remains stagnant and only begins to increase continuously once the Basic Social Security Act 
comes into force in 1963, because it includes 
since then the social contributions.
Figure 20
Source: Comín y Díaz (2005) and own elaboration.
Throughout the period four tax reforms have taken place: in 1940, in 1957, in 1964 and in 1977-79. The first three, during the dictator-
ship, design a tax system based on real direct taxation (or product, which does not person-
alize the tax), but above all on indirect taxa-tion on consumption, tax monopolies and foreign trade revenue (the customs tariff). An 
inelastic fiscal system to the evolution of na-tional income, regressive and with a high level of fraud and tax avoidance, which denied the 
redistributive function of income and wealth, completely away from the international trends of the countries of the centre. And this in spite of the attempts of the Falangist economists in the 1950s to personalize direct taxes, attempts that clashed head-on with the ideology and in-terests of the dictator himself and the ruling classes.
Figure 21 shows the revenue structure of the 
Central Government, showing the preponder-
ance of indirect taxes, particularly between 1957 and 1977. Figure 22 shows the structure 
of revenues for the General Government, with 
social contributions being in the first place be-cause of its tax collection importance.
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Figure 21
Source: Comín y Díaz (2005; table 12.9) and own elaboration.
Figure 22
Source: Comín y Díaz (2005; table 12.26) and own elaboration.As we have pointed out, this is a tax system 
which, in terms of collecting capacity, will be far away from the international environment. Fig-ure 23 depicts that, despite sustained growth 
in revenues since the recovery of democracy, we have only managed to achieve the average 
fiscal pressure of all the OECD countries, from 
which it must be reminded that there are coun-
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Figure 23
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics and own elaboration.
tries with a very low fiscal pressure, as would 
be the case in Chile, Mexico, Turkey, but also in the United States. And, despite the stabiliza-
tion of the fiscal pressure since the mid-1980s in European countries and in the European Union of 15, Spain does not manage to reach 
the average of these areas by starting, on the contrary, a reduction of tax revenues since the crisis of 1993, a decline that does not occur in our environment. 
The fiscal reform is undertaken with the recov-ery of democracy39, when some of those young falangists from the 50’s who participated since 
the final years of the dictatorship, will follow the tax model of the countries of Western Eu-rope. Since the approval of the Law on Urgent 
Measures for Fiscal Reform, November 14th 
1977, until the approval of the new tax figures, several years must pass, as the complete pack-
age proposed by the UCD Government will be 
approved just in 1978, the Personal Income Tax Law (IRPF) and the Corporate Income Tax 
39 For fiscal reform in the period of democracy, Braña 
(2008 and 2010a) and Pan-Montojo (2015) can be con-sulted.
Law, having to overcome from the beginning 
the strong opposition of business associations and sectors of the government itself and its political party. And even though the law on ur-gent measures had already fallen into the trap of granting a tax amnesty, under the euphe-mism of “voluntary regularization”, one more in the history of tax reforms in Spain, it will 
not be able to reduce fraud, by blocking mea-sures for that purpose. Table 2, taken from the 
only official report that attempted to provide an estimate of IRPF fraud, gives an idea of its magnitude and characteristics. A fraud what has reached our days as one of the most char-acteristic features of the Spanish tax system40.
40 A recent evaluation of the fraud in the income, that in-
cludes the year 1982, is the one of Torregrosa (2015b). The work makes a fairly comprehensive review of exist-ing estimates. To make her own estimation, the author uses a very sophisticated econometric methodology, with 
many and debatable assumptions and with a very low ex-
planatory power which, in our opinion, raises doubts as 
to whether the numbers are correct, even knowing that 
the fraud existed and still exists. In any case, Torregrosa’s work achieves very high underreporting rates for in-comes other than salaried work.41
Table 2Levels of compliance with personal income tax(Thousands of units and percentages of magnitudes declared with respect to economic magni-tudes)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986Units re-
quired to declare 9,971.0 10,400.5 10,336.4 10,786.1 9,599.4 10,116.5 10,520.6 10,959.3% Tax re-turns forms 52.20 56.90 56.17 56.10 59.37 58.71 60.95 64.09% Total in-come 42.90 47.4 48.92 49.57 50.83 50.52 51.95 55.08% Income 
from labour 
54.00 62.07 63.42 64.76 66.63 66.66 68.88 71.28% Other incomes 22.34 24.34 24.56 25.20 23.41 24.60 26.15 30.36
Source: Lagares (1991) and own elaboration.
There are also estimates of fraud in other tax-
es, to which we will refer, because of their rel-evance, to those of Value Added Tax. In one of 
them (Gómez de Enterría, Melis and Romero, 1998), referring to the years 1990 to 1994, 
fraud is around 28%, which would be the dif-
ference between the theoretical collection es-timated according to National Accounts and actual collection.
From 1982 onwards, the new neo-liberal cur-rents, which have led to the reduction of the 
tax burden, have been brought into Spain by the academy and the economic circles opposed 
to the tax reform, because of their supposed harmful effects on the accumulation of capital, savings and employment, refusing to use the 
tax system for redistributive purposes41. All of this framed in the so-called theory of the fail-
ures of the public sector and on the return to 
the requirement of the budgetary balance. Is very striking that, at the forefront of these pro-
posals, there will be some of those who have 
41 One of the most striking proposals, because there is a 
lie plainly, is that the tax is simpler the fewer the number 
of brackets of the tax rate structure. Except that the tax is 
of a single type, the linear tax, gives equal to have two that 
two thousand brackets, the taxpayer will always have to do the same operations to calculate its payment. But the 
difference is that the fewer the brackets the worse the tax 
rate is adjusted to the progressivity, treating the same, with the same tax rate, taxpayers who may have very dif-ferent income levels.
so fiercely defended and designed the democ-
racy fiscal reform. To those opinions, whose 
media apogee will occur with the beginning of the decade of the 90, the economic leaders of 
the PSOE will end up joining, begining to blur the structure of the IRPF. Although with the entrance into the European Economic Commu-
nity the Value Added Tax will be approved and implemented in 1991, as well as the Law on 
the Net Worth Tax will finally be approved too (although the corporate patrimony will remain off the tax). And all this without forgetting the complexity that will introduce the process of 
fiscal decentralization, on which the Autono-mous Communities will increasingly have tax power, which will lead to a race to tax competi-tion downwards.
Now, has the fiscal reform of democracy suc-
ceeded in reducing the existing inequality 
related to the distribution of market income 
before taxation? The results of Torregrosa’s work (2015a) indicate that the tax system 
worsened the distribution of income. In 1970, 
with the fiscal system of the dictatorship, the 
Gini index increased by 1.73 percentage points (from 37.92 to 41.36) after applying taxes, in 
1982 increased by 2.57 points (from 41, 94 to 
44.51) and in 1990 increased by 6.94 points 
(from 42.23 to 49.17). And this is because the tax system was already regressive in 1970, the 
regressivity declined slightly in 1982, but in-
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creased again in 1990, although without reach-ing the magnitude of 1970, showing the results 
of the fiscal counter-revolution we have done 
reference above. These results do not take into 
account fiscal fraud, which would increase the 
regressivity, since fraud is known to be higher in the higher income strata, in capital income and in self-employed entrepreneurs (Torre-
grosa; 2015b).With regard to public expenditure, Comín 
(1996b) has described what happens after 
the victory of the rebels in the civil war as the 
return to the police state, because, as we have seen, the intervention of the State will take 
place by mean of regulation and public cor-porations. Figure 24 shows the evolution of central government expenditures throughout 
the period covered by this essay, as well as the 
expenditures of General Government since the 
year in which their accounts begin to be drawn up.
Figure 24
Source: Comín y Díaz (2005) and own elaboration.
After the increase in public expenditures in 
specific years of the 40’s, an increase derived from the cancellation of civil war spending, 
public expenditures in relation to GDP will de-
crease with respect to the levels of the 2nd Re-
public. And, in the case of the Central Govern-ment, it will only increase in the second half of the 60s, to decrease again up to the recovery 
of democracy, when the Welfare State begins 
to be built. With regard to the expenditure of 
the General Government, of which there is data only from 1958, will not stop increasing, with 
the incorporation of Social Security benefits, with a strong momentum under democracy.
The best way to know the destination of public 
expenditure is to use the functional classifica-
tion, which is shown in figure 25 for Central 
Government, although is quite imperfect by 
the amount of unclassified expenses. The im-portance of defence expenditures42, followed 
by expenditures on economic services, stands out until the 1970s. The expenses related to the Welfare State, health and pensions, as well 
as to education, did not acquire importance 
until the 70’s.
42 According to Catalán (1994; 378), in 1950 headed the expenditure in defence in Europe, and in 1957 ranked 
third after France and Greece.43
Figure 25
Source: Comín y Díaz (2005; table 12.18) and own elaboration.
For the General Government institutions, the 
functional classification of public expenditure 
only has been available since 1976, as shown 
in figure 26, which includes the growing activ-ity in the area of health and education of the Autonomous Communities. The importance of pension expenditures in democracy, which 
absorbs more than a third of the total, is con-
firmed. By importance it follows the expendi-
tures on economic services, health and edu-cation. This demonstrates the change which occurs in democracy in the modalities of in-tervention of the State. From a regulatory state and with a strong presence of direct interven-tion in production, there is a gradual shift to a 
State based on policies of indirect intervention 
through public expenditure, on which the con-
struction of a modest Welfare State becomes relevant.
Figure 26
Source: Argimón et allia (1999) and own elaboration.
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And we say modest, because despite the ef-fort made and on the same way of what hap-pens with the tax system, Spain never reaches the Central Europe countries –the European 
Union- levels of benefits. The expenditure on 
social benefits, which in the mid-1960s did not reach 60% of the European standard, in 
the mid-1990s will be below 75% of that Eu-
ropean standard, with a difference of about six 
percentage points in terms of GDP. Figure 27 
shows the evolution of social benefits expendi-
ture along the whole period, both with respect 
to GDP and per person in real terms, repro-
ducing the pattern that we have already been highlighting: its practice nonexistence until the mid-60s and the push with the recovery of democracy.
Figure 27
Source: Espuelas Barroso (2013) and own elaboration.
Nevertheless, since 1976 the expenses in un-
employment benefits are going to take a grow-
ing part of the total public social expenditure, with a maximum of 20.4% in 1993, showing the data represented in Figure 27 that the growth of social spending related to the Welfare State during the PSOE governments is much smaller 
than is said, only 3.34 p.p. between 1982 and 1993.
The overview on the State´s indirect interven-tion would incomplete unless a reference to 
the balance of incomes and expenditures, to the fiscal balance, were not made. From its 
beginnings the ministers of finance were “lib-
erals” convinced of the “holy fear of the defi-cit”, as doctrine and strategy proposed already 
in 1905 by whom was then the Minister of Finance, Jose Echegaray, a doctrine that with 
other forms but the same background will be again in force since 1993. Was this strategy im-
plemented in practice? Rather not. Figure 28 
shows the evolution of the fiscal balance (net 
lending or net borrowing in terms of National 
Accounts) for both Central Government and 
General Government (since 1958). It is sur-
prising that until 1952 there will be no surplus 
in the State’s accounts, since that year there is 
a period of relative stability, with small deficits 
and surpluses, which goes back to 1976, turn-
ing to the deficit, but increasing in magnitude year after year until arriving in 1986 up to 5.08%. There is a short recovery, within which 
there is still a deficit, between 1986 and 1991 and increasing again in the last two years of the period, of course, continuing until the mid-
dle of the first decade of this century. The evo-
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lution of the fiscal balance of the General Gov-ernment practically runs parallel to that of the 
Central Government, the only difference is that 
the deficit will be higher in recent years, due to 
the imbalances presented by the Autonomous Communities.
Figure 28
Source: for Central Government data, Comín y Díaz (2005; table 12.17). For General Government 1958-1963, Cuentas 
de las AA.PP.; 1964-1993, Dirección General de Análisis Macroeconómico y Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Hacienda.
How were the deficits financed? Answering 
this question leads us to examine the public 
debt43. Figure 29 provides three sets of data. 
With regard to the public debt issued each 
year, its amount will be in absolute terms very reduced, until the explosion of the 80s. The expenses of the civil war were covered for the 
most part by the “patriotic subscriptions” and with advances from the Bank of Spain, which 
became debt later on. As we have seen, having 
just paid the war arrears and the extraordinary 
budgets of the post-war period, the public defi-cit was reduced until reaching even years with surplus. This situation was still kept thanks to 
43 For the period 1940-1975 we rely on Comín (2015), al-though we do not share its comments on the “legality” or 
“constitutionality” of the issues of certain types of public 
debt, since it makes no sense to use those terms in a dic-tatorship.
the public debt issued to finance extra-budget-
ary expenditures, since debt issues in absolute 
value were higher than the amount of the defi-
cits, even debt was issued when there was a surplus.
In fact, the most of the public debt issued be-
tween 1940 and 1975 (68%) will be used to 
the financing of public investments, extraordi-
nary budgets and subsidies to private invest-
ment by means of State guarantees. Thus, debt 
issues (of various types) served to finance 
public banks, which granted privileged credit to companies and sectors according to the 
government’s economic policy; INI and other autonomous agencies (such as the National Colonization Institute, the National Housing 
Institute or the State Forest Heritage); or for 
the realization of public works, railroad tracks and road network. A relevant aspect is that, 
until 1958, the public debt was automatically 
pledgeable (see footnote 17) at the Bank of 
Spain, a financing system that is attributed to 
be inflationary.
The reduction of the debt issued and the ex-
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Figure 29
Source: Comín y Díaz (2005; tables 12.13 y 12.34) and own elaboration.pense for the payment of interests, until 1976, 
the year in which it becomes irrelevant, was 
made possible by a combination of factors. 
Firstly, because of the low level of deficits. Sec-
ondly, by the effect of economic growth from 
1951 until the crisis of 1973. Thirdly, by the 
existence of inflation as a tax, which reduced 
its real value. An inflation generated by the 
possibility of automatic pledging of the debt 
subscribed by the financial institutions in the Bank of Spain, which gave rise to the increase of the amount of money in circulation, what 
has been called the indirect monetization of 
the public deficit. Fourth, the real interest rates 
of the debt were negative during almost all the 
period of the dictatorship, due to the “financial repression” of those years44. 
During the first years of the restoration of de-
mocracy, public debt issues will remain con-tained, as it will happen to the payment of in-
terests, increasing slightly in relation to GDP. 
But since 1983, there has been an explosion in 
44 Financial repression which, on the other hand, was a widespread policy in the countries of the centre of capi-
talism between 1945 and 1980, consisted of the estab-lishment of capital controls that prevented or limited 
their exit abroad, along with the imposition on banks of a regulation that forced him to maintain a percentage of his 
funds in public bonds, setting also a maximum interest 
rate for bank deposits.
the use of debt as a financing instrument for 
the Welfare State, given the impossibility of 
the tax system to provide sufficient resources 
for it. After reaching a peak in 1986, it stabi-lizes, again increasing with the onset of the crisis of 1993. Between 1975 and 1982 the ac-cess of the Treasury to the Bank of Spain will 
be restricted, cannot be more than 12% of the 
expenditure budget of the State, but it’s been 
increased the legal coefficient of cash of the 
financial institutions up to 20%, which means 
that it must be covered by more government 
bonds. Since the arrival of the PSOE to the govern-ment, this will adopt a new philosophy for the 
management of the debt. This new philoso-
phy consisted of financing through the finan-
cial market, establishing a public debt market with new types of securities, in the short, me-dium and long term, also trying to extend the average life of the portfolio. Though this new 
philosophy drove financing to become more expensive, increasing interest payments. This period will culminate in the granting of the 
independence of the Bank of Spain (to be ap-
proved by law in 1995), the reduction of the legal cash ratio and the elimination of the 
obligatory investment ratio, starting a period 
of prosperity in which the debt will be reduced 47
substantially with respect to GDP, due to the strong economic growth of those years, until 
reaching the Great Recession.
3. Industry, Internationalisation 
and Technology in Spain.Once we have drawn the main aspects of the huge transformation of the Spanish economy, 
we think it is very important focus what can be considered the main core of that change which 
has had to do with the interrelationship be-tween three crucial axes: the industrialization process, the growing internationalisation and the technological change. 
3.1. Industrialisation.
3.1.1 General Overview.As we have seen in epigraph 1, the consoli-
dation of Spain’s industrial development did not occur until the second half of the twenti-eth century. As late as 1951, value-added in agriculture was greater than in manufactur-ing and mining. Nevertheless, from that point on industrial production came to represent the foundation on which the dynamism of the 
Spanish economy was built. Thus, the sector 
that expanded most quickly between 1954 and 1974 was industry, with its share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) rising from 17.6 up 
to 28.4 per cent over the same period. Subse-
quently, economic problems impacting on the industrial sector resulted in a reversal of this 
trend, but for the whole period it is clear that value-added in the industrial sector increased at a faster rate than in the rest of the economy, 
and its contribution to the growth of the econ-omy correspondingly increased (to 26.8 per cent). The composition of industry changed in response to market opportunities and the uneven incidence of technological change. 
Growth was initially focused on manufactur-ing, as elsewhere in Europe, and was facilitated 
by the process of import substitution. Indeed, in the earlier period exports were generally only a marginal aspect of production, although 
a few exceptions can be mentioned, such as 
shipbuilding and publishing. The main sources of dynamism in the economy – sectors such as 
chemicals, metal machinery, processed rub-
ber and plastics, non-metal mineral products and paper and printing – were the recipients 
of a remarkable proportion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).The dynamism of this period implied a degree of convergence with the industrial structures of the principal west European economies, including those of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). There remained signifi-
cant differences between Spain and the other European economies, however. By the end of 1975 the Spanish economy suffered from an excessive specialization in the production of consumer and intermediate goods of low tech-nological sophistication, while at the same time capital goods industries were under-rep-resented (Buesa and Molero, 1998).
The crisis of the mid-70’s, which abruptly ended the dominant model of accumulation prevalent since the civil war, transformed the 
sectoral patterns of growth above described. From the perspective of industry, the most 
significant impact was the change in relative 
prices caused by the hike in energy prices and 
the instability associated to the crisis in the international monetary system. This led to a dramatic reduction in the demand for manu-
factured products, particularly in such sub-sec-tors as metallurgy, heavy machinery and elec-trical materials. As a result of the introduction of new technologies, demand simultaneously increased in sectors such as electronics, preci-
sion instruments and the automobile and ae-ro-nautical industries. Over the period 1975–95, there was a profound transformation in the structure of the Spanish manufacturing sec-tor. Many of the earlier sources of dynamism faced crisis, reversal and stagnation. Overall, however, these structural changes amounted to a reversal in the previous tendency towards greater structural convergence with the large European economies. This divergence is slight 
and gradual, but clearly discernible.
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3.1.2 Spain in the nineteen ﬁfties: a 
turning point in the development of the 
national economy.After the long period of nationalist and pro-
tectionist regression which began in the last few decades of the 19th century and was ex-
acerbated in the years following the Civil War (1936–1939), Spanish economic policy faced 
significant changes towards a more open pol-
icy. These changes had become inevitable in the 1950s when the expansion of the economy 
meant that it was faced with a difﬁcult situa-
tion as this growth required major increases in imports, whilst at the same time exports were 
unlikely to be able to maintain the required 
rate of growth. As a consequence of the limited 
capacity required by international demand, 
the primary products were not sufﬁcient to 
achieve growth above a certain rate. Mean-while, the almost exclusive focus of industrial activities on the domestic market meant that 
they were unable to generate the foreign cur-rency necessary to defray the cost of the im-
ports required by this sector. These external 
constraints became so extreme that by the end of the decade international reserves had vir-
tually been exhausted. Added to this was the 
fact that it was extremely difﬁcult to introduce the technological and production changes re-
quired by the industry because productivity was not included in the salary system (Torres, 1956). 
The introduction of technology became a fac-tor which was essential to the high industrial production growth rates which followed and even exceeded those seen for most of the nine-
teen ﬁfties, due to the fact that demand was 
unlikely, in terms of amount or quality, to be 
covered by domestic production. Technology 
creation was characterised by a limited state sector (universities and research centres), 
badly equipped in terms of human, material 
and ﬁnancial resources, which bore very little relation to the economic reality of the country, 
and by companies which were generally badly 
equipped and were created or maintained in a protected environment with no competition, operating in an economic framework seriously 
distorted by the state interventionism we have 
described above. If the fact that there was not a policy to promote the creation of technology is added to this, the vital need to make use of the 
importation of technology could not have been 
clearer (Gonzalez and Jimenez, 1979).
The most significant part of the overall growth during the 50s was what seen on the industrial sector, with accumulative rates of over 6.5% a year. It was in this decade that industry clearly overtook agriculture in terms of its economic 
importance, and the economy ceased to be as dependent on agricultural harvests, instead 
becoming more closely linked to the industrial cycle. Industrial growth in turn has a correla-
tion with the considerable level of investment 
largely aimed at the acquisition of equipment, an extremely important form of technological modernisation. Industrial growth was seen in 
all sectors but more than 50% can be attrib-uted to the intermediate and capital good in-
dustries; sectors which were to be crucial in 
the industrial expansion of the 70’s. From the point of view of foreign trade, it was 
a case of import substitution industrialisa-
tion, with the highest rates of substitution be-ing seen in consumer products (with a lower 
technological content) and greater difﬁculties 
being encountered in intermediate and capital goods. It gradually led to a contradiction which 
created serious difﬁculties for the develop-ment process, especially due to the fact that it did not develop a parallel export potential which could have helped to reduce the grow-
ing trade deﬁcit. It should also be pointed out 
that the sectors on which imports substitution 
reached signiﬁcant levels provided the funda-
mental basis for the expansion of industrial 
exports which began to take place in the fol-
lowing decade (Donges, 1976; Torres, 1958). 
The problems highlighted for the production of national technology also included organiza-tive aspects, meaning so that these technolo-
gies also generally had to be imported. Indeed, 
in the 50’s, what could be called the ﬁrst wave of mass importation took place, an essential part of which was the 1953 Pact of Madrid signed with the United States. The compensa-
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tion offered by the US included the technical cooperation agreements which made avail-
able different devices for the identiﬁcation and importation of new technologies. The ar-rival of these new technologies thus took place during this period through information and 
training trips to the United States, visits by ex-perts to Spain and the organisation of courses, seminars, conferences, etc. (Buesa and Molero, 1982).
3.1.3. Full expansion of the model: de-
finitive “take off” in the 60’s.The framework of economic opening-up and 
liberalization described above also appeared in the more limited context of industrial policy in the sixties. Although there was still a gen-eral reference to maintain the previous model 
mainly based on the domestic market, the in-terest in foreign markets grew constantly. All of this was slightly out of step with the general 
liberalizing measures of the 50’s and within an increasing opening-up philosophy. Moreover, as we have seen, the international context was 
extremely favourable and was crucial to build 
up what is known as new equilibrium factors which allowed for a rapid and constant growth 
until the crisis of the 70’s.
Changes in industry could be seen quickly and as well as the growth rate of the Industrial 
Gross Product in constant values experienced 
between 1960 and 1966 the most dynamic period in the 20th Century (Braña, Buesa and Molero, 1978). This strong dynamism resulted in the industrial sector gaining importance in the national production, going from 19.6% in 
1958 up to 28.4% in 1974 (see figure 4 above). 
In this way, the contribution of the industrial sector to the economic growth in the period 
of 1958–1974 can be estimated in 33.7%, the most important growth in the longer period from 1954 to 1998 (Buesa and Molero, 2000). From a sectorial perspective, we must remark the increasing weight of modern activities in Chemicals and Metal-mechanic macro sectors, 
combined with a decreasing weight of more traditional activities such as textiles, food and 
beverages, and so on. The formers were lead-
ing the industrial dynamism all over the world 
and were characterised by a much more tech-
nological intensity; so, technology comes to 
be a determinant factor for the success of the 
model; in other words, the Spanish economy, in its process of strong growth and industrial-
ization, required much more and much better technological resources.
However, the capability of producing domes-tically such resources was very limited and, 
therefore, turning to foreign technology be-came an extremely important factor. As a result of such a scarce internal activity, the strong de-mand of technology due to the growth and di-
versification of the industry was to be covered 
to a great extent by imported technologies. In fact, as already indicated (Braña, Buesa and Molero, 1984), a great part of the companies involved in the few national programs avail-
able were also important buyers of foreign technology, indicating that the domestic effort played a clear complementary role to guaran-tee the incorporation of imported technology (Hidalgo and Molero, 2009).
The purchase of foreign technology is reflected in a strong increase of the payments registered 
in the balance of payments and in the imbal-ance in terms of incomes. Indeed, the pay-ments went from 19.3 million dollars in 1958 
up to 199.6 million in 1972, and the deficit in income during this same period went from 17.5 million dollars to 179 million dollars. In 
addition, we must point out that the ratio be-tween R&D spending and payments for im-ported technology were very low (0.25) while in developed countries it is usually higher than 1, ranging from 1.3 in Italy to 200 in the United States (Ardura, 1973).
3.1.4. Crisis and industrial transforma-
tion.
Since the crisis of the 70’s and coinciding with the Spanish political transition to a democratic 
regime, the role of the industry can be charac-terised as follows: (Buesa and Molero, 1998):
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• The industry started a process of de-clining in its weight within the economy 
as a whole; it decreased form 31.38% 
before the crisis to 29.12% in 1994.
• The Value Added (VA) growth was 
based more on employment (quantity) 
than in productivity (quality). In other words: “we witness the end of the for-
mer development pattern before the 
crisis (…), The industry gives the role of pushing the economy to the service sector and with this change the econo-
my entered in a stage characterised by moderate rates of expansion” (Buesa 
and Molero, 1988; 36).
• Within manufacturing industries, the 
growth was more significant in those with the highest and lowest level of technological composition, what led to a higher weight in the overall structure 
(figure 30). This polarization relegated the intermediated technological level sectors. 
Figure 30
Sectorial composition according to technological complexity
Source: own elaboration.
the Spanish economy showed an inter-nal technological composition clearly 
below the average of EU countries.
• A particularly relevant change had to do with the relative role of domestic and foreign markets. On one hand we witnessed a lost in the capacity for cov-ering the growing inner demand, while, on the other, exports showed a very rel-evant growth.
• This twofold process was more re-marked in sectors with higher techno-
logical complexity. The most significant case is that of the highest technological 
complexity. In them, the capability to cover the domestic market was 70 % 
before Spain entered in the European 
Community and in just 10 years that ra-tio decreased to 36 %. At the same time export propensity grew up from 20% in 
the 80’s up to more than 50 % in 1995. Behind that tendency is a very fast pro-cess of intra-sectoral specialization in 
which multinational enterprises affili-ated had a very important role. (Molero and Buesa, 1993). • In other European countries we can see parallel process albeit with some 
differences. The most significant one is 
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In this so complex and changing context, the industrial policy suffered critical changes as well. It is not easy to have a simple picture of 
its evolution, but as a summary of the main guidelines, orienting the policy we can cite the 
three elements: the deregulation process; the 
growing relegation of public enterprises and 
the reduction of fiscal and financial incentives 
that we have been analysed in the previous epigraph.
The consequences of those changes were non-
negligible. Regarding the external opening up 
process, a rapid balance indicates that overall reaction of the Spanish economy was posi-tive in terms of the growth of national income. However, looking more accurately to foreign trade a simultaneous trend of increasing im-ports happened and a less dynamic process of 
exports augmenting; thus the trade deficit in-creased, partially due to the lesser technologi-cal development of our manufactures.
The financial deregulation brought an increase 
of interest’s rates, which affected a substantial 
number of firms in the first part of the 80’s. 
In parallel, a process of dissociation between 
banks and manufacturing firms took place, changing a historical structural relation. More-over, we witnessed a process of reduction of 
the interest of the banks for the productive 
system and a growing one for financial activi-
ties as objectives for their investment. In third place, the reduction of other instru-ments affected positively to the competition 
framework. Added to the liberalization of for-
eign trade, another general consequence of the 
new industrial policy was a substantial reduc-tion of industrial prices, in contrast with the 
difficulties existing for reducing many prices 
of service activities, not affected by a similar process of deregulation.  
3.2. Internationalisation The period of economic nationalism and autar-
chy was accompanied by an important reaction 
against the ‘de-nationalization’ of the Spanish 
economy, because of the strong presence of foreign capital. Legislation after the civil war 
restricted foreign investments even more, as the international context of the world war nat-urally limited transnational investments. Nev-
ertheless, it did not take long for voices to be raised in favour of a change in the legislation 
towards liberalization (Muñoz et al., 1978).The United States emerged since the Second World War as the undisputed leading invest-
ing country; in Europe, the Marshall Plan rein-
forced the position of US firms. Despite Spain did not participate directly in that Plan, the signature of the Madrid Pact in 1953, which 
permitted the establishment of American mili-
tary bases on Spanish soil, had a similar effect as far as the opening of Spanish legislation was concerned. The implications of the Ma-
drid Pact went far beyond its direct military 
consequences: it involved important techno-
logical collaborations, provided the basis for 
the ‘productivity movement’ and entailed a 
certain liberalization of the Spanish economy, especially with regard to the reduction of le-
gal obstacles to make investments by US firms. However, while there were some important developments in the wake of the Madrid Pact, 
substantial internationalization only occurred 
in the wake of the Stabilization and Liberaliza-tion reforms of 1959.
3.2.1. Development, liberalization and 
the first great wave of investments.
These changes marked a definitive change in 
policy towards foreign investments, bringing Spanish policy gradually into line with the ma-
jority of other European countries (Braña et al. 1984). From that point, FDI helped to initiate a period of extraordinarily high growth that would slow down only with the onset of the economic crisis of 1973 and the political tran-
sition (Buesa and Molero, 1988; Muñoz et al., 
1978). The favourable conditions that the new 
law established consisted of a new and stable legal framework and a range of incentives for foreign investors. Their positive impact was 
reinforced by the dynamism of the Spanish 
economy after 1959, with GDP rising by an average of 7 per cent annually since 1960 un-til 1975 and industrial production more than tripling over the same period. Moreover, in the 
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wake of the first reforms, Spain underwent a steady if gradual opening of its economy, with reforms to trade policy, exchange controls and 
foreign investment. A major milestone in this process was the signing of the 1970 preferen-tial agreement with the EC.
In this context, foreign investment grew quick-
ly from Ptas 2bn in 1960 to Ptas 19bn in 1975, 
as firms sought to take advantage of low labour costs and growing markets and to overcome 
the remaining trade barriers. In terms of the origin of investments, in the initial period US 
firms constituted the principal investors, ac-counting for nearly 30 per cent of investment (though the aggregate share of EC states was larger). Sectorially, investment was concen-trated on the manufacturing sector (more than 75 per cent of the total in 1960–75 though in-vestments in services were increasing towards the end of this period) with most of it in the most dynamic industrial sectors.The effect of this investment in technological 
capabilities is difficult to be estimated with 
some precision but a reasonable approxima-
tion can be made. With regard to embodied 
technologies, foreign firms were superior to domestic for practically every indicator 
considered (Rodriguez de Pablo 1980). This would seem to support the hypothesis that the 
presence of foreign firms raised business stan-
dards in Spanish industry during the boom 
period. With respect to disembodied technol-
ogies, the importance of the contribution of 
foreign firms can be confirmed by census data 
for 1977, which reveal that firms with foreign capital over 20 per cent made almost 60 per cent of the total payments for foreign technolo-
gies, and also by analysis of the contracts for technology transfer, which shows that a sig-
nificant share was carried out by foreign firms, 
frequently with their respective parent compa-nies (Molero, 1982). There was a strong cor-
relation between control of the firms and tech-nology imports, especially in technologically more advanced sectors like electric materials, chemicals and vehicles.From the outset, with a few exceptions, foreign 
firms integrated quite well with local condi-
tions and economic power. This can be seen from analysing participation in pro-active in-dustrial policies, and secondly, the relative po-
sition reached by MNCs’ subsidiaries within the core of Spanish economic forces.On the former point, a detailed microanalysis 
of the firms that received state aid in many dif-ferent ways and through a large variety of pro-grammes in the period 1963–77 (Braña et al. 
1984) allows the importance of foreign firms in state aid within every sector and the gener-
osity of the benefits they received to be mea-sured (Buesa and Molero, 1988). For a nucleus of three very important sectors – chemicals, 
electronic equipment and vehicles – both gen-
erosity in benefits and the importance of firms receiving state aid reached very high levels. A 
large number of firms with foreign capital or technology received state aid. The kind of in-
centives offered to foreign firms included tax reductions, incentives for exporting, facilities 
for importing intermediate inputs, flexibil-
ity for investment amortizing, aids for labour force training, cheap and well-organized land, and so on.
The position of foreign firms was evaluated by Muñoz et al. (1978) through a detailed analysis 
of the 300 largest industrial firms in 1973. As 
early as 1973 their role was comparable with 
large Spanish industrial firms in terms of sales (particularly) and employees. However, such 
penetration came in different ways; in just un-der half of the cases foreign enterprises acted 
separately, otherwise they joined different 
fractions of Spanish capital (private or public). These mixed examples added more economic 
value than the exclusively foreign firms.
3.2.2. Recovery, economic integration 
and a new wave.It is important to start with some comments 
about the transformation of the external and 
internal framework. The period between 1974 
and 1985 can be considered as a transitional period towards a new growth model which 
was to become firmly established in the second half of the 1980s. In this period, foreign invest-
ment inflows experienced a period of stagna-
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tion, followed by a recovery. But the most sig-
nificant changes were qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Prior to this period the model 
of development in Spain had been principally 
a Fordist one, characterized by specialization 
based on the chemical and metal-mechanical 
sectors. The internationalization of firms cor-responded to the classical model of cost reduc-
tion, growing markets and firm-specific capa-
bilities acquired in the home country. During the crisis, this model of internationalization, 
however, became increasingly precarious. In order to adapt to a more volatile inter-national 
business climate, firms were forced to adopt 
more flexible strategies facing to new interna-tional competitors and technical change (espe-cially the growth of information technology).For Spain itself, the crisis meant a particularly 
strong economic impact. The problems facing 
many industrial sectors required radical re-
structuring. This process of adjustment was 
marked by a more intensive opening-up of the 
economy, notably more liberal foreign invest-ment and trade regimes. The prospect of EC 
membership reinforced and required these 
policy changes. In addition, two other basic changes affected Spanish industrial develop-
ment. The first was related to the diminished 
importance of industry in terms of both its 
absolute impact on the macro economy and 
its contribution to growth. The second change had to do with a deep process of industrial re-structuring, which led to a shift in the struc-tural composition of the economy away from some of the leading sectors during the ‘devel-
opment’ period, and towards new sectors.
These changes were accompanied by a signifi-
cant modification in the kind of strategy ad-
opted by Multinational Corporations (MNCS). 
The most notable was the change in the bal-
ance between domestic and external markets. 
In recent years, a great number of multination-als with a presence in Spain have consolidat-ed their strategies of using the country as an export platform. The adoption of such strate-gies explains to a large extent the aforemen-tioned improvement in export performance. The increasing export activity does not mean 
that foreign markets have completely replaced 
domestic ones; just the contrary, the available 
studies confirm that domestic sales are still 
clearly the first objective of most of the firms, although in some cases exports are nearly as important as domestic sales. However, in spite of the growing importance of export strate-
gies the trade balance remains negative. The reason for this resides in the fact that imports 
have also expanded very quickly; moreover, all 
the available studies concur that companies with foreign capital have a higher import pro-pensity than those with domestic capital. The 
result of all this has been a deficit in the foreign 
trade balance.Another fundamental element of MNCs strat-
egies has been their technological activities, 
playing a very significant role in the Spanish research and development (R&D) system. Ac-cording to OECD 1997 estimates, MNCs repre-sent more than one-third of total Spanish R&D 
expenditures (government R&D - GERD) and 
more than half of total (business enterprise R&D - BERD) (Molero et al., 1995).
More detailed information can be obtained 
from the first Spanish survey on innovation carried out in 1994, at the end of the period of our study. According to this information, for-
eign firms were 4.66 per cent of the total, but represent 14.85 per cent of those with R&D 
centres. Their contribution to the national sys-
tem of innovation (NSI) is more visible when we compare their technological activity with national averages. Thus, while only 10.7 per 
cent of national firms can be classified as in-
novative, in foreign firms this ratio rises to 
around 50 per cent. Similarly, about a quarter 
of national firms in the sample declare having R&D activities, against 62 – 72 per cent in the case of foreign companies. Finally, less than 18 
per cent of national firms have R&D laborato-ries, compared to 64 per cent in the group of 
non-EU firms.This superiority in innovation activity is one of 
the most general findings of existing research 
(Bajo and Lopez, 1995; Circulo de Empresarios, 
1995; González, 1997; Martin and Velázquez, 
1996; Salas and Merino, 1996; Molero 1995); 
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however, there are underlying factors – apart from nationality – that could explain a con-
siderable part of those differences. In fact, all 
available studies confirm two basic causes of 
the distance between Spanish and foreign en-terprises: the size and sector of activity. When 
both elements are controlled for, the techno-
logical effort is quite similar between the two 
clusters (Martín and Velázquez, 1996; Salas and Merino, 1996). Nevertheless, it is mislead-ing to assert that MNCs do not represent any 
special contribution to technological develop-ment. In fact, MNCs constitute a central part 
of the Spanish NSI because they usually have a longer tradition of organizing innovative ac-
tivities, are of a size more adequate to carry them out and are more active in sectors that focus on current technological developments, notwithstanding the fact that Spanish compa-
nies can face firm-to-firm comparisons when they enter the same sphere.The situation is different if we consider tech-nology importation. In this case, all studies reveal that MNCs import foreign technology 
more intensely (González, 1997; Martin and 
Velázquez, 1996; Salas and Merino, 1996; Sán-chez, 1984). Leaving aside other factors, what is most critical is the special link they have with their mother companies, which consti-
tute the first external source of technological 
know-how (Molero, 1982; Molero et al., 1995).A last point to highlight is that the presence 
of foreign firms in the Spanish market has in-
creased considerably, they now constitute one 
of the most efficient and powerful groups of 
industrial firms. As has been noted (Buesa and 
Molero, 1998), the presence of foreign affiliates 
among the leading firms in each sector dou-
bled between 1982 and 1992. If we look at the way in which they execute their control over 
the firms, we also can find substantial changes 
in the period. Thus, in 1982 foreign firms had 
absolute control in 53.3 per cent of all their 
subsidiaries, another 26.3 per cent was under 
majority control, and in 20.4 per cent of cases it was a minority one, implying the existence of important Spanish partners. Ten years later 
absolute control was exercised in 75.6 per cent 
of cases, majority control affected 17.2 per cent and minority control was reduced to 7.2 
per cent of firms. In other words, the strategy of association with national economic forces 
was considerably reduced, while the integra-tion into multinational groups advanced in the same period.
3.3. Technology: from the external de-
pendence to the internationalisation In the two previous sections, we faced the crit-ical role technology played. Now we shall ad-dress this topic more in detail, in order to have 
a better understanding of its meaning.
3.3.1. The 50’s.
Starting from the decade of 50’s, we have al-ready explained how the acceleration of the 
industrial growth substantially increased the demand for productive and organisational 
technology substantially. As the national capa-
bility for developing such inputs was very far from the necessities, the result was an inevita-
ble dependence on foreign technology. Recent works carried out (Hidalgo and Molero, 2009) using new information on patents, allow us to add new knowledge to understand the pan-orama. 
In the nineteen fifties, 54,254 patents were granted in Spain, of which 53.6% were of Span-ish origin and 46.4% were from foreign coun-tries. This decade saw a large increase in the 
number of foreign innovators in Spanish in-
dustry. Thus, whilst at the beginning of the de-cade the patents of foreign origin represented 
barely 26% of the total of those granted, in the 
second half of the decade they just exceeded the patents of Spanish origin.Analysing with more details the origin of the 
patents from abroad Germany (19.4%), France (17.0%) and the United States (15.7%) are 
the countries with the biggest influence on the innovative activity undertaken in Spain. 
It should be stressed that these are precisely the countries with which most of the technol-ogy transfer agreements were signed, illustrat-ing the high level of complementarity in exis-
tence between both processes. It can also be 
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seen that other European countries, especially 
Great Britain (10.6%), Switzerland (10.5%), Italy (7.7%), Holland (6.6%) and, to a lesser degree, Sweden (3.0%) and Belgium (2.6%) exported their technology to Spain at this time.
There are remarkable sectorial details. The 
first noticeable fact is that in the coal, mineral, oil and gas extraction, chemicals, oil and coal 
derivative sectors, and in the basic metal in-dustries, foreign patents have had more weight than those of domestic origin. In the wood and cork industries, and the manufacture of non-metallic minerals and electricity, gas and steam, foreign patents also exceed those of do-
mestic origin, although only by a small margin.
It has been also studied the role of foreign technology in the technological pattern of in-dustrial sectors, arriving to the conclusion 
that there were substantial differences across 
them. Two contrasting groups were identified (Hidalgo and Molero, 2009): 
• The first group of sectors is basically made up of sectors from the energy and chemical industries. These sectors typically have high levels of concentra-tion, as well as a relatively large innova-
tion size. They have a level of stability 
and there are significant barriers to en-try for new innovators. In addition, the presence of foreign innovators is very 
high; this is particularly noticeable in the group of leaders. 
• By contrast, group 2 is made up of very traditional manufacturing industries related to the manufacture of food products, leather and footwear, wood and cork, furniture and paper and printing. They typically have limited levels of concentration in the innova-tive activity, an innovation size that is also limited, and a high level of innova-
tive turbulence reflected in high levels 
of instability and high growth rates. The presence of foreign patents is more limited in these sectors, as is the case 
with the number of foreign inventors in the group of leaders.
3.3.2. The 60’s.The complete development of the pattern of 
growth initiated in the 50’s even estneded more the demand for technology. At the same 
time, this confirmed the insufficiency of the domestic production of technology what led to a reinforced need of foreign technology. Other recent investigations help to cast new light on the phenomenon (Hidalgo, Molero and Penas, 2010).
Firstly, the quota of patents granted in Spain 
attributable to research is split in domestic (46.2%) and foreign (53.8%) origin. In gener-al, there was an increase in the growth of pat-ents of foreign origin, which rose from 47.0% in 1960 up to 64.4% in 1966. There are differ-ent reasons for this phenomenon: on one hand, the increased internationalization of the tech-
nological activity carried out by multinational 
companies, mainly from United States, Germa-ny, France and Switzerland, which wished to protect their products on the Spanish market 
[44] and on the other, the search by these com-panies for a greater capacity to gain access to 
locally based technological know-how.The analysis related to the origin of the pat-ents granted shows that 89.8% of foreign patents come from seven countries, show-ing so a strong concentration of the external 
technological influence. This influence was concentrated in the United States (21.5%), 
Germany (18.1%), France (17.3%), Switzer-
land (10.3%), United Kingdom (9.6%), Italy (7.6%) and Holland (5.2%). This fact provides 
evidence of a significant increase in the foreign technological development of the companies from these countries from the sixties onwards, contrasting with the more centralized ap-
proach to research strategies taken by other countries such as Japan and Sweden, whose 
quotas of patents granted in Spain were of just 0.6% and 1.8%, respectively (Cantwell, 1995). On the other hand, not surprisingly, compa-nies from small European countries such as Holland and Switzerland show a high level of foreign technological activity, and this has re-mained at a steady rate of 50% up to the nine-ties (Cantwell, 1989).
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We have identified as well the technological areas that have had the strongest impact on the industrial development of Spain in 1960–1966. The transfer of these patents to sectors of economic activity showed a strong concen-tration in the most traditional sectors, the so-called mature industries, such as foodstuff, textile, furniture and accessories, footwear, metallic products and diverse manufacturing industries. However, there was a fast domestic development of other sectors with a stronger technological content such as the production of chemical products, mechanical and electric machines, shipping material and electricity, gas and steam. The patents from the United States greatly complemented the technology domes-
tically developed by Spanish companies, for example in the foodstuff, textile and metallic products. However, they were mainly focused 
on the development of two basic sectors: the chemical and the mechanical machinery sec-tors. The chemical sector (chemical products 
and rubber products) is the most relevant with 
a total of 2,554 patents distributed in the tech-nological areas of inorganic chemistry, glass, organic chemistry, organic macromolecular compounds, and dyes, paints, polishes, natural resins and adhesives.On the other hand, the European countries which provided the greatest amount of tech-nology to the Spanish industry have focused their patents in areas related to different in-
dustrial techniques supporting the industrial development in the more traditional industrial sectors. We must also highlight the European technological momentum to other sectors such as the production of mechanical machinery in 
the area of combustion engines and engineer-
ing elements, with 2,117 patents; and the sec-tor of shipping material with 1 582 patents. 
However, the European contribution was con-centrated on the development of the chemistry sector with 3 202 patents, with an especial role 
of Germany. These data show that most of the technologi-cal development has taken place in those sec-
tors where foreign patents have contributed to complement the technology developed do-
mestically. We can therefore say that the ex-
istence of a basis of technological knowledge 
in a sector becomes a necessary condition for 
the efficient assimilation of a technology from the outside, regardless of its origin. This would explain, for example, the later development in Spain (in the 1980s) of technologies associ-ated to the electricity, gas and steam sectors, 
which origin can be found in the incorporation of technology coming from another source 
than the one developed by national companies in the studied period. The impact of different technological factors on the differences of the industrial sectors 
growth rate has also been investigated (Hidal-go, Molero and Penas, 2010). Concretely it was considered direct incorporation of technology, 
technology embodied in other activities, own 
technological capabilities and capacities for technology diffusion. The model proposed is a regression model whose generic expression is: 
LNVAit ¼ c + b1LNPVit + b2LNMPit + b3TMit + 
b4LNPEit + b5LNPXit + eit
With the variables defined as:VA, change in added value in the 1960 value for 
pesetas (lagging Ln);
PV, change in productivity per labour unit cost 
in 1960 pesetas (Ln);
MP, change in production imports (Ln);
TM, tendency of production imports (Dummy);PE, patents granted to residents – Spanish pat-
ents (Ln);PX, patents granted to non-residents – foreign 
patents (Ln);
Subscripts i and t refer to the economic sectors and time, respectively.The result is integrated with information on 11 groups of industrial activity, categorized ac-
cordingly to the National Classification of Eco-nomic Activities of 1952 (CNAE-1952).
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The main findings are the followings:  
• Beginning with the direct incorpora-tion of technology, foreign patents 
show a positive influence and an elas-
ticity, which fits perfectly with the 
general knowledge available on the Spanish industrialization process: the dependence on foreign technology is 
clear, now that the sector’s detail has 
been made with the available data col-
lected by the authors of the study.
• Secondly, foreign technology incor-porated to production imports also 
shows a positive influence on industri-al growth. Although elasticity is lower, this shows the modernization of pro-duction structures, which are strongly dependent on importing foreign inter-
mediate products, and the significant role it has played in the Spanish econ-
omy’s industrial boom.
• Thirdly, the results of the Dummy vari-
able (TM) are also relatively coherent with the proposals. The relationship 
shows that other variables’ effects in-
crease by 14.9% in sectors with lower dependence on foreign production im-ports. This is a clear sign that the exis-
tence of the countries’ own capacities 
(absorption capacity) allow for more 
efficient use of technological knowl-
edge incorporated by other sources.
• The variable with the most difficult 
results to be interpretated is the one referred to Spanish patents. The nega-tive value of the factor shows that when Spanish patent production was lower, growth rates were higher within in-dustrial sectors. Someone could argue 
that a higher abundance of that patent type does not necessarily mean higher 
availability of technology, but rather on some occasions, knowledge (or technology) on a lower level than that of foreign technology. Consider that 
these two problems are not present in 
foreign patents, where firms register 
practically all patents and the average innovative level is clearly superior. 
• Last but not least, it is remarkable the 
role of productivity. This variable is 
significant, with a positive sign and its 
elasticity has the highest value; there-fore, the dissemination potential plays a very important role in diffusing tech-nologies among the Spanish industrial production system and resulted in higher industrial growth.
• Taking a deeper look to the sector as-
pects, the indicators available allow for replicating model estimates for two 
subsets of sectors. In the mature sec-tors, technology incorporation through 
productive imports best explains the 
dynamic behaviour and moderniza-tion of the sectors in this group. On the other hand, in most modern sectors 
that source is not significant, while the incorporation of knowledge through patents it is so. Unfortunately, the former was accompanied 
by an almost complete lack of policy initia-
tives to address the structural problem of the lack of technical know-how. The results were three-fold: a lack of resources dedicated to the creation of technology, the continuing need to 
import foreign technologies and the absence of effective policies to tackle this situation.
3.3.3. 70’s onward.
It is at the end of 60’s and beginning of 70’s 
that we can use for the first time reasonable indicators on R&D to measure the inner effort on technological innovation. Measured in con-stant 1970 pesetas, expenditure on R&D went from Ptas 5,593 mn. in 1970 to Ptas 17,038 
mn. in 1980, equivalent to a 0.23 per cent to 
0.44 per cent increase in GDP. Despite this sub-stantial increase, in comparative terms Spain 
was still underperforming, with comparable countries such as Ireland or Italy assigning as much as 0.77 and 1.12 per cent, respectively, in 
the early 80’s. The results for patenting activ-
ity are similar: whereas in Spain the number of 
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patents per 10,000 inhabitants went from 13 
in 1965 up to 24 in 1983, the average figures for the OECD countries were 36 and 47 for the 
same years. These figures include public insti-tutions and universities.
Arguably, a better idea of the technological 
state of industry is obtained from data that re-
fer only to firms. In general terms, companies 
contributed around half of R&D, rising from 
0.10 per cent of GDP at the beginning of the 
70’s up to 0.25 per cent in 1983. From a quali-tative point of view, the precarious nature of 
the situation is revealed by the following facts 
at the beginning of the 80’s:
• Barely 500 companies carried out any R&D at all.
• Only 23 companies had a team of re-
searchers (or their full-time equiva-lents) greater than 25 people.
• More than 90 per cent of the expendi-
ture on R&D carried out by firms were 
directly financed by the firms them-
selves; public resources accounted for only a little over 5 per cent.
• Most R&D has been concentrated in a few products, leaving a wide range of products where there is little or no R&D involved at all. Radios and radio apparatus, motor engines, non-ferrous metals and electrical machinery ac-counted for more than 40 per cent of the total R&D resources in 1983.While R&D is only one indicator of technol-
ogy acquisition, the lack of resources devoted 
to this activity was symptomatic of a broader 
innovation problem among domestic firms. By contrast, the import of technology increased steadily during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 
1980s, technological sales abroad grew, but they still only accounted for 25 per cent of 
imports – a much lower figure than for most 
other developed countries (Sánchez, 1984). 
This imbalance between technology purchases 
and sales has been a characteristic of Spanish industrial development right up to the nineties 
(Casado, 1995; Molero, 1996). The contracts 
for the transfer of technology published by the Ministry of Industry and Energy allow a more 
detailed analysis. This data source confirms the tendency towards an increase of imports, from an average of 350 contracts annually in the mid-1960s to more than 700 a decade lat-
er, and between 800 and 900 by the mid-1980s 
(Braña, Buesa and Molero, 1984; Buesa and 
Molero, 1988). The most obvious repercus-
sion was an increase in liabilities from 1978 to 
1982, rising from Ptas 30.5 bn. to Ptas 78 bn. a 
year (Gil Peláez, 1983). But the importance of 
the contracts goes far beyond their number – 
they reveal the unequal situation under which they were drawn up. Contracts often incorpo-rated multiple clauses which seriously limited the assimilation of the technology, a situation 
declared ‘abusive’ by various international 
organizations. For instance, subcontracting 
of the acquired technology was some-times 
prohibited, restrictions were placed on the ex-port of the products manufactured using the transferred technology and purchases of other 
goods were ‘tied’ to the sale of technology.The effect of foreign technology on Spanish 
industry can be estimated from the Ministry 
of Industry’s data on the largest industrial 
firms. In several studies (MINER, 1983) it was 
estimated that production based on foreign technology was more than 23 per cent for the 
whole group of firms – a figure that was much 
higher for firms in high technological content 
sectors. These sectors were characterized by the strong presence of foreign investments, 
foreign firms which are crucial for the import 
of technology (Molero, 1982; Sánchez, 1984).
As it has already been noted, from a policy per-
spective the quantitative restrictions on the 
purchase of external technologies became pro-gressively less important in a macroeconomic 
context characterized by an enhanced capac-ity to attract foreign savings. With regard to the lack of applied research with relevance for 
industry, in the National Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) and universities, few changes 
were perceptible. Nor was much effort made 
to provide incentives for Spanish firms to per-form R&D. While there was a growing aware-
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ness that something had to be done to address 
the problem of the lack of national sources of innovation, the taken initiatives made little or not improved the overall technological capa-
bility of Spanish industry (Molero, 1982).
3.3.4. Recovery, integration and active 
technological policies.
Throughout the 80’s, some significant changes 
occurred in the both two levels of technologi-
cal activity of Spanish firms and the general orientation of policy. First of all, the consolida-
tion of a strong cyclical boom was associated with an unprecedented increase in the inter-nationalization of the economy. This was asso-ciated with the economic reform efforts of the socialist government that came to the power 
in the early 80’s. The new government also in-troduced measures to reform the institutional 
framework of technology policy and scientific 
activity, including the establishment of nation-
al R&D plans as a basic instrument to increase domestic technological resources and the reor-ganization of the Centre for Technological and 
Industrial Development (CDTI) as an agency 
to stimulate the innovative activity of firms (a range of incentives for R&D was also intro-duced at the level of the autonomous commu-nities).The University Reform Law provided an institutional framework to put university 
research in touch with the business commu-nity and the sectoral plans of the Ministry of Industry and Energy were reorganized. The policy implemented in 1973, designed to im-prove the process of technology imports, was 
definitively abandoned, not just because the 
results were poor but because of the challenge and opportunity of entry into the EU in 1986. 
This certainly made easier a more favourable institutional framework for promoting techno-
logical innovation and enabled Spanish firms and researchers to take part in a range of inter-
national collaborative programmes.
Against this background there were some sig-
nificant – though not sufficient – changes in the technological capacity of the Spanish econ-omy. Throughout the 1980s, the share of R&D 
in GDP almost doubled, but stagnation in the 
Figure 31
Comparative evolution of R&D/GDP
Source: OECD and own elaboration.60
In respect of other indicators (such as number of patents and levels of importation of foreign 
technology) there it appears to have been a little change. While the lack of change in these 
respects may reflect more general internation-alization trends in respect of technological activities (European Commission 1998), the 
Spanish case stands out for two reasons: first, the high initial level of dependency and sec-ond, the relatively low dynamism of technolog-ical exports generated in the Spanish economy 
(figure 32).
1990s meant that on average R&D stood at 0.9 
per cent of GDP (figure 31). While this indica-tor shows that the gap with the rest of Europe 
has narrowed, it still remains substantial. 
Figure 32
Auto-sufficiency ratio
Source: Own elaboration with OECD data.
Overall then, the wide-ranging reforms have helped to improve the situation with regard to 
Spain’s innovative capability (notably in educa-tion) and technological dependence. Still, in the new international context, R&D performance is still far away from satisfactory. Technology 
policy needed to be reconsidered, bearing in mind the need to relocate resources within an institutional structure that is more responsive 
to contemporary demands. Improving absorp-
tive capabilities starts from devoting more re-
sources (in both R&D and education) and in-
creasing tacit efforts. In this last period, those 
favourable conditions fared better, because of the much more intense international competi-tion and the internationalization of the econo-
my as described in the previous section.
3.3.5. Technological specialisation. 
Strengths and weaknesses.
To finish this analysis, it is very useful to make 
a balance of the relative position of the Spanish industrial sector regarding its technological international specialisation. In spite of there 
are other significant elements to evaluate that position, we understand the technological one 
reflects very well the strengths and weakness the system had at the end of the period under analysis.
To carry out this balance we use the concept of Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA), 
defined as follows for a defined period of time.
RTAij= (Patij / Pat wj)/ (Patitot/Patwtot)
Patij = Patents of the country i in the j sector
Patwj = Patents of the world in the j sector
Patitot = Total patents of country i
Patwtot = Total world patents
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The interpretation is similar at what is cur-rently done for the Revealed Commercial Ad-vantage of Bela Balassa. If RTA > 1, means that 
country i performs relatively better in sector j 
than for its total technological activity; then we say country i has Technological Advantages in 
sector j. On the contrary way, if RTA < 1 we say 
country i has technological disadvantages be-cause in this sect the country performs lower than for the average economy. Of course the higher RTA > 1 the greater are the advantages. 
Similarly, lower is RTA < 1, the more important are the disadvantages the country shows in the sector.We have calculated the results for the years at the end of our period. Results are shown in 
figure 33. In order to have a simple a clearer picture we have eliminated those sectors for which the distance over or under 1 is very light. Moreover, we have distinguished sectors with intensive advantages or disadvantages 
when RTA is over 1,2 or below 0,8.
Figure 33
Source: Own elaboration.
With the help of the NACE codes, it is relatively easy to catch the most relevant conclusions. Starting with sectors with intensive disad-
vantages, all belonging to DL category, that is, Electric and electronic material, close to ICTs technologies. Interestingly enough, practically all the rest of DL sectors also show disadvan-tages, although less intensive. The other side 
of the coin is shown by Intensive and moder-
ate advantages group, in which we can find a 
number of the so-called traditional industries, plus some chemical and mechanical sectors. 
In other words, the capability of the Spanish industrial sector for competing in most tech-nologically advanced sectors was clearly very limited, with a few exceptions. This will remain 
for the incoming years and will be a central part of the explanation of the more severe im-pact of future crisis.
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4. Concluding remarks.This long paper concludes when Spain was immersed in a new economic crisis, in 1992-1993, which coincides with the last govern-ment, in minority, of the PSOE. A government that extends until the March 1996 elections, which will win the Popular Party.The 1992-1993 crisis has as antecedent the 
outbreak of Japan’s real estate bubble in 1990, 
the impact of the Gulf War between 1990 and 
1991 and the conflict in the Balkans (due to 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration) in 1991, all of 
them are going to lead to inflationary pres-sures. Between the second half of 1992 and 
the first one of 1993 the crisis of the European 
Monetary System occurs, when it begins to be 
doubted that the conditions of convergence 
defined in the Maastricht Treaty to reach the 
monetary union could be fulfilled. The trigger was the result of the referendum held in Den-mark on 2 July 1992, in which the “no” to the treaty won (although in a later referendum, held on 18 May 1993, the “yes” came out). On 
16 September, what was called Black Wednes-day, the pound, the lira, the escudo and the peseta are devalued (the latter a 5%)45, with 
the consequence that the United Kingdom and Italy withdraw from the European mechanism of exchange rates. There is a serious crisis in European monetary cooperation policies, as 
well as a lack of confidence that the economic and monetary union could take place. Domes-tically, in 1992, Spain was affected on the one 
hand by a severe drought, on the other by the exhaustion of the investment effort of the lav-ish 1992 events.Once this crisis is over, a period of economic 
boom begins, in which the euro is put into op-
eration, a period that will reach until the Great Recession 2008, in which Spain is going to suf-fer one of the most serious situations in its re-cent history. And despite the fact that Spain, ac-cording to the dominant interpretation, would 
have finally been able to modernize afterwards, 
first, the great economic acceleration and the important productive transformations of the 
45 Then came a second devaluation, on November 21, 
1992, at 6%. And a third, on May 13, 1993, by 8%.
decades before the crisis of the 70s; second, 
the recovery of democracy; third, the entry 
into the European Economic Community; and, fourth, the integration into the Euro area and 
the uncritical acceptance of the unstoppable 
process of a new globalization. “Moderniza-tion” was an aspiration that came from the progressive elites since the nineteenth centu-ry. But, if it exists, it will not, in our view, place 
the country in a position equivalent to the cen-tral countries, as it will show what happened 
with the Great Recession.The crisis of 1992-1993 had already revealed the important weaknesses of the Spanish economy, since its entrance into the Europe-an Economic Community did not correct the 
“structural” problems of the economy or so-
ciety. In the prosperity period, between 1996 
and 2007, the GDP of the Spanish economy 
grew slightly above the European Union as a 
whole, but less than the world GDP as a whole too. Although it is not the aim of this paper to analyse what has happened in the last 25 
years, since it requires another essay, if it is 
worth briefly pointing out the factors that led 
to that growth. The first one is the progress 
made in non-negligible areas of the productive economy, with increasingly competitive sec-tors such as the agroindustry, part of the ma-chinery and transportation industry and cer-
tain branches of chemistry. All combined with 
the availability of a more qualified workforce 
and greater capability to absorb technical progress. The second one, the aid from the Eu-
ropean budget funds, which came to represent 
a percentage point more to GDP growth, an 
aid higher than it would have been in the Mar-shall Plan. The third one, the massive arrival of emigrants, especially from Latin America, who 
provided cheap labour where needed. And the 
fourth one, a boom in construction again, this time of a private origin linked to a real estate 
bubble, on which the financial system and, in 
particular, savings banks, played an essential 
role. Next to the real estate bubble was a bank-
ing bubble, with the Bank of Spain doing noth-
ing about it, busy looking away, obsessed with 
asking for reforms in the labour market and in 
the public pension system (which supposedly 
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would be threatened with bankruptcy). The 
private indebtedness of financial institutions, 
non-financial corporations and families grew 
explosively, but not the public debt, which is very striking.
The real estate boom had a substantial in-
crease in tax revenues, it is talked about of 
another bubble, the fiscal bubble, which even 
allowed after a long time General Government accounts closed with a surplus for three con-secutive years (2005-2007). But these rev-enues went to the construction of infrastruc-tures not always fully or effectively used, with often negative social returns. Wild construc-
tion and urban planning in many cases led to the destruction of the landscape and corrup-
tion as a business model, without any political 
parties with government responsibilities, na-
tional or regional, putting the slightest brake46. 
It could even be said that this model of urban-
ism, to the extent that it would be linked in part to tourism, would imply a particular type of “extractivism”47.In spite of all of this, the message was “Spain is going well”. Spain was a country of suc-
cess, an example to follow. The Great Reces-sion has shown, in our view, that this state-
ment should be considerably nuanced. Thus, 
important problems of the productive system remain without a long-term solution, espe-
cially those related to the capability to create 
technologies in quantity and quality enough to 
achieve a more robust and sustainable devel-opment. From the point of view of society, if it is true that the restoration of democracy was achieved, it was at the price of not touching, 
not talking about the past of the dictatorship. 
On the other hand, individual behaviour based 
46 When the report of Margrete Auken (A6-0082/2009), 
on the impact of extensive urbanisation in Spain on in-dividual rights of European citizens, on the environment and on the application of EU law, was discussed in the Eu-
ropean Parliament, denouncing these abuses, the PSOE and PP MEPs were against to its adoption.
47 “(E)xtractivism will refer to those activities that re-move large volumes of unprocessed (or limited) natural resources, especially for export as a function of the de-mand of the central countries. Extractivism is not limited to minerals or petroleum. There is also agrarian, forestry, 
fishing, including tourist extractivism”. (Acosta, 2016).
on tax fraud, the underground economy, per-
sisted and even spread, being one of the high-est in Europe, similar to that of the countries of Eastern Europe and that has not stopped to 
grow, in accordance to estimates that begin in 
1964 and arrive until 2013. The picaresque, amorality and lack of ethics have increased without having generated any severe “punish-
ment” in the votes received by the parties ei-ther on the right or the political centre. 
We end this essay by stating that Spain’s suc-cess is not as clear as oneself wants to expose from orthodox positions or mainstream. This is not to deny in the least that there are aspects of the productive system which have changed, 
changes associated with the globalization pro-
cess and the creation of global value chains, 
such as the fact that a set of companies become 
transnational and achieve to conquer foreign markets all around the world. Nor is it to deny that the Spaniards have managed to emerge 
from a dictatorship and establish a system of representative democracy, as well as to im-prove their standard of living, at least until the 
Great Recession, partly thanks to the construc-tion of a modest Welfare State, as well as great 
strides have been made in civil, individual, mi-norities rights. On the other hand, other collec-
tive and communal rights have been reduced, 
inequality has not declined in recent years, while poverty has increased within the “aus-
terity” mandate of what has come to be called “ The Markets”48.
48 Vitali S, Glattfelder JB, Battiston S (2011): “The Net-
work of Global Corporate Control”. PLoS ONE 6(10): 
e25995. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025995.64
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